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Abstract
In a world in which rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can
influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness of an experiment
(public signal). We characterize the set of distributions of posterior beliefs that can
be induced by an experiment, and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a
sender to benefit from persuasion. We then provide sufficient conditions for the sender
to benefit from persuasion for almost every pair of prior beliefs, even when there is no
value of persuasion under a common prior. Our main condition is that the receiver’s
action depends on his beliefs only through his expectation of some random variable.
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1 Introduction
A notable feature of organizations is that those with decision-making power are lobbied. In
many cases, individuals influence decision makers by changing the information available to
them. For instance, individuals can acquire and communicate hard evidence, or signal soft
information. Another way of influencing decision makers’ learning is through strategic exper-
imentation — i.e., by establishing what they can learn from the outcome of a public experi-
ment (as in, for example, Brocas and Carrillo (2007) and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)).
Persuasion through strategic experimentation is pervasive in economics and politics. A
pharmaceutical company chooses which initial animal tests to perform, and the results influ-
ence the Food and Drug Administration’s decision to approve human testing. A central bank
shapes the informativeness of a market index observed by households (such as inflation) by
determining which information is collected and how to compute the index. A news channel
selects the questions that the host asks during an electoral debate, and the answers affect
voters’ opinions about the candidates. In all of these cases, modifying the characteristics
of the experiment (e.g., changing the test, the rules to generate the index, or the questions
asked) changes what decision makers can learn. In many relevant cases, persuasion takes
place within environments in which individuals hold heterogeneous prior beliefs.1 In this
paper, we ask: how does open disagreement affect an individual’s benefit from persuading
others, and her choice of an optimal experiment?
The next example, in which a politician (sender) seeks to maximize the effort of a bureau-
crat (receiver), illustrates our main insights. The politician has proposed a new project that
must be implemented by an existing government agency. She wants to maximize the proba-
bility that the project will be successfully implemented because this increases her reelection
probability. However, the probability of successful implementation depends on the effort
exerted by the bureaucrat who controls the agency. Since the bureaucrat wants to maximize
his career perspectives, he will exert more effort only if he thinks that the new project is
1Many papers study the role of heterogeneous priors in economics and politics. Giat et al. (2010) use data
on pharmaceutical projects to study R&D under heterogeneous priors; Patton and Timmermann (2010) find
empirical evidence that heterogeneity in prior beliefs is an important factor explaining the cross-sectional
dispersion in forecasts of GDP growth and inflation; Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) study the effects of prior
beliefs on media bias.
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more beneficial than other existing projects to his agency’s own goals. In addition to having
different goals, in many cases, the politician and the bureaucrat have heterogeneous prior
beliefs about the likely effects of the policy — see Hirsch (forthcoming) for a review of the
literature on principal-agent models of policymaking in political organizations, and on the
empirical evidence of belief disagreement between politicians and bureaucrats. To motivate
the bureaucrat to exert more effort, suppose that, prior to fully implementing the policy, the
politician can design a policy experiment — a pilot test that generates a public signal about
how the new policy will benefit the agency. The bureaucrat can then use the information
uncovered by this experiment to update his beliefs and adjust his effort choice. How does
the politician optimally design such a policy experiment?
This problem has gained increasing attention from governments around the world. For
instance, in 2010, David Cameron created the Behavioural Insights Team (BIT), a unit under
the Cabinet Office. The BIT would conduct small-scale tests of certain policy interventions
before they were broadly implemented by the UK government. The launch of the program
“was greeted with a great scepticism” (Rutter, 2015). However, it eventually had an impor-
tant impact on the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats. Before the program,
new governments would try to impose new ideas and projects on bureaucrats without much
empirical information to persuade them about the new policy’s value. With the program,
the government has more flexibility and control to uncover hard information to persuade
bureaucrats.2 After the initial success of the program, the BIT now “permeates almost ev-
ery area of government policy,” and are setting up similar programs in Australia, Singapore,
Germany and the US (Rutter, 2015).
Therefore, consider a politician who can design a policy experiment to influence a bu-
reaucrat. For simplicity, let the politician’s payoff be a, which is the bureaucrat’s effort to
2In a recent interview, David Halpern (chief executive of BIT) said, “If you’re a permanent secretary or
head of department[,] you have seen lots of ideas come and go. New governments come in on a wave of new
shiny ideas. But permanent secretaries can read a graph pretty well” (Rutter, 2015). This is an old concern
for bureaucrats around the globe. In 1996, Richard Darman (director of the US Office of Management and
Budget and a member of President Bush’s Cabinet from 1989 to 1993) argued: “As a society, we have been
guilty of what can fairly be termed policy corruption. In pursuit of bold visions, we have launched one risky
scheme after another without anything like responsible evidence. [...] Instead of [...] new Federal programs
launched at full scale, [the President] could initiate a set of bold research trials” (Darman, 1996).
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implement the new project. The bureaucrat’s payoff is uBur(a, θ) = θa − aρρ , where ρ ≥ 2
is a known preference parameter, and θ > 0 captures the project’s uncertain benefit to the
agency’s goals. The bureaucrat’s effort choice is, then, a concave function of his expectation,
a∗ = (EBur[θ])
1
ρ−1 . Prior to fully implementing the policy, the politician can design a policy
experiment that generates a public signal about θ.3 Can the politician benefit from persua-
sion? That is, can she design an experiment that, on average, leads the bureaucrat to exert
more effort?
First, suppose that players have a common prior belief over θ. The linearity of the politi-
cian’s payoff and the concavity of the bureaucrat’s effort choice imply that the politician’s
expected payoff is a concave function of beliefs. Therefore, there is no experiment that ben-
efits the politician — see Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) (KG henceforth). Now, suppose
that players have heterogeneous prior beliefs. Let EPol[θ] and EBur[θ] be the expected value
of θ from the point of view of the politician and the bureaucrat. Trivially, if effort is lin-
ear in expectation (ρ = 2) and the bureaucrat is a “skeptic” (EBur[θ] < EPol[θ]), then the
politician benefits from persuading the bureaucrat. In particular, from the politician’s point
of view, a fully informative experiment that reveals θ is better than no experiment.4 One
could then conjecture that if effort is too concave (high ρ) or if the bureaucrat is already a
“believer” (EBur[θ] > EPol[θ]), then the politician cannot benefit from designing an experi-
ment. Perhaps surprisingly, this conjecture is wrong. Given any finite ρ, if there are at least
three possible values of θ, then the politician generically benefits from persuasion, where
genericity is interpreted over the space of pairs of prior beliefs.
To provide some intuition for this result, suppose that ρ = 2 so that a∗ = EBur[θ] in
the previous example. Consider possible states θ ∈ {1, 1.5, 2}: the politician’s prior belief
over states is pPol = (0.85, 0.10, 0.05), while the bureaucrat’s prior is pBur = (0.10, 0.40, 0.50).
3For example, the UK government proposed a change in the way that Job Centre advisors conducted in-
terviews with job seekers. The BIT conducted a small-scale test of the new policy (the Loughton Job Centre
experiment) before the policy was scaled up to other Job Centres. According to the BIT, the pilot program
showed very promising results and even increased staff happiness (see Figure 1.1 in The Behavioural In-
sights Team Update Report 2013-2015, available at http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/publications/the-
behavioural-insights-team-update-report-2013-2015/).
4Nevertheless, even if the bureaucrat is a skeptic, a fully informative experiment is often suboptimal. See
Section 4.
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The bureaucrat is then a believer of the policy, EPol[θ] = 1.1 < EBur[θ] = 1.7. Clearly, a
fully revealing experiment does not benefit the politician, as she expects the bureaucrat’s
expectation of θ to decrease, on average. Nevertheless, the politician can still benefit from
strategic experimentation. The optimal experiment determines only whether or not θ = 1.5.
The bureaucrat’s expectation decreases to 1.5 when the experiment reveals θ = 1.5, and it
increases to 0.1×1+0.5×2
0.1+0.5
= 1.83 when the experiment shows that θ 6= 1.5. With this experi-
ment, the politician expects the average effort to increase to 0.90× 1.83 + 0.10× 1.5 = 1.8.
To understand the result, first notice that players disagree on the likelihood of observing
the different experimental outcomes, although they fully understand how the experiment is
generated. The sender can then exploit this disagreement: In our example, the politician as-
signs more probability (0.90) than the bureaucrat (0.60) to the “beneficial” experiment result
{θ 6= 1.5}, and relatively less to the “detrimental” result {θ = 1.5}. In fact, we show that,
for this case, optimal experiments are always designed so that the sender is relatively more
optimistic than the receiver regarding the likelihood of observing “better” experiment results
(results that induce actions yielding a higher payoff to the sender). We also show that such
experiments are (generically) available to the sender, irrespective of the receiver’s beliefs.
Motivated by this example, we consider a general persuasion model in which a sender can
influence a receiver’s behavior by designing his informational environment. After observing
the realization of a public experiment, the receiver applies Bayes’ rule to update his belief,
and chooses an action accordingly. The sender has no private information and can influence
this action by determining what the receiver can learn from the experiment - i.e., by speci-
fying the statistical relation of the experimental outcomes to the underlying state. We make
three assumptions regarding how Bayesian players process information. First, it is common
knowledge that players hold different prior beliefs about the state - i.e., they “agree to dis-
agree.” Second, this disagreement is non-dogmatic: each player initially assigns a positive
probability to each possible state of the world.5 Third, the experiment chosen by the sender is
“commonly understood,” in the sense that if players knew the actual realization of the state,
then they would agree on the likelihood of observing each possible experimental outcome.
We start our analysis by asking: from the sender’s perspective, what is the set of distri-
5See Galperti (2015) for the case of prior beliefs with different supports.
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butions of posterior beliefs that can be induced by an experiment? We first show that, given
priors pS and pR, posteriors qS and qR form a bijection — qR is derived from qS through a
perspective transformation. Moreover, this transformation is independent of the actual ex-
periment. Consequently, given prior beliefs, the probability distribution of posterior beliefs
of only one player suffices to derive the joint probability distribution of posteriors generated
by an arbitrary experiment. This result allows us to characterize the set of distributions of
posteriors that can be induced by an experiment (Proposition 1). An important implication
of our results is that belief disagreement does not expand this set - that is, it does not allow
the sender to generate “more ways” to persuade the receiver. We then use the tools in KG
to solve for the sender’s optimal experiment (Proposition 2) and provide a necessary and
sufficient condition for a sender to benefit from experimentation (Corollary 1), and for the
optimal experiment to be fully revealing (Corollary 2).
In Section 4, we focus on models in which (i) the receiver’s action equals his expectation
of the state, a∗ = ER[θ]; and (ii) the sender’s payoff uS(a, θ) is a smooth function of the re-
ceiver’s action. We show that if there are three or more distinct states and ∂uS(a, θ)/∂a 6= 0,
then a sender generically benefits from persuasion. This result holds regardless of the re-
lationship between the sender’s payoff and the unknown state; regardless of the curvature
of the sender’s payoff with respect to the receiver’s action; and in spite of the fact that the
sender cannot induce “more” distributions over posterior beliefs than in the common-prior
case.6 To gain some intuition, consider the case uS(a, θ) = a, and note that every experiment
induces a lottery over the receiver’s actions. Belief disagreement over states translates to
disagreement over the likelihood of different experimental outcomes and, hence, over the like-
lihood of different receiver’s actions. We first show that persuasion is valuable whenever the
sender can design a lottery in which she is relatively more optimistic than the receiver about
higher, thus, more beneficial, actions. We then show that such lotteries exist for a generic
pair of players’ prior beliefs. In fact, any optimal experiment satisfies this property in a
strong sense: the sender’s relative optimism increases in the actions induced by the lottery.7
6Remarkably, the sender generically benefits from persuasion even in the most extreme case of conflict of
preferences uS(a, θ) = −uR(a, θ), so that the sender wants to minimize the receiver’s payoff.
7Formally, if PrS [a]/PrR[a] is the likelihood ratio of the probability that sender and receiver assign to
the action a being induced through an experiment, then PrS [a]/PrR[a] increases in a under an optimal
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Our results show that persuasion should be widespread in situations of open disagreement.
Yildiz (2004), Che and Kartik (2009), Van den Steen (2004, 2009, 2010a, 2011) and Hirsch
(forthcoming) study models with heterogeneous priors in which a sender would prefer to face
a like-minded receiver. In these cases, a sender believes the receiver’s view to be wrong, and
by providing a signal, she is likely to move the receiver’s decision towards what she considers
the right decision. That is, persuasion is valuable if belief disagreement is harmful to the
sender. In other situations, however, the sender may benefit from belief disagreement. In our
previous example, a politician interested in implementing a policy would prefer a bureaucrat
that is overly optimistic about the policy’s benefits. Providing a fully informative experiment
to such a receiver would then be detrimental to the sender. Nevertheless, we find that persua-
sion is valuable even in these cases, in which belief disagreement is beneficial to the sender.
Our paper is primarily related to two strands in the literature.
Persuasion through Strategic Experimentation: Some recent papers study the gains to
players from controlling the information that reaches decision makers. In Brocas and Car-
rillo (2007), a leader without private information sways a follower’s decision in her favor by
deciding the time at which a decision must be made. As information arrives sequentially,
choosing the timing of the decision is equivalent to shaping (in a particular way) the infor-
mation available to the follower. Duggan and Martinelli (2011) consider one media outlet
that can affect electoral outcomes by choosing the “slant” of its news reports. Gill and Sgroi
(2008, 2012) consider a privately informed principal who can subject herself to a test designed
to provide public information about her type, and can optimally choose the test’s difficulty.
Rayo and Segal (2010) study optimal advertising when a company can design how to reveal
its product’s attributes, but it cannot distort this information. Kolotilin (2014, 2015) studies
optimal persuasion mechanisms to a privately informed receiver. In a somewhat different
setting, Ivanov (2010) studies the benefit to a principal of limiting the information available
to a privately informed agent when they both engage in strategic communication (i.e., cheap
talk). The paper most closely related to ours is KG. The authors analyze the problem of a
sender who wants to persuade a receiver to change his action for arbitrary state-dependent
preferences for both the sender and the receiver, and for arbitrary, but common, prior be-
experiment.
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liefs. We contribute to this literature by introducing and analyzing a new motive for strategic
experimentation: belief disagreement over an unknown state of the world.
Heterogeneous Priors and Persuasion: Several papers in economics, finance and politics
have explored the implications of heterogeneous priors for equilibrium behavior and the per-
formance of different economic institutions. In particular, Yildiz (2004), Van den Steen (2004,
2009, 2010a, 2011), Che and Kartik (2009) and Hirsch (forthcoming) show that heterogeneous
priors increase agents’ incentives to acquire information, as each agent believes that new evi-
dence will back his “point of view” and, thus, “persuade” others. Our work complements this
view by showing that persuasion may be valuable even when others hold “beneficial” beliefs
from the sender’s perspective. We also differ from this work in that we consider situations in
which the sender has more leeway in shaping the information that reaches decision makers.
We present the model’s general setup in Section 2. Section 3 characterizes the value of
persuasion. In Section 4, we examine a class of persuasion models. Section 5 presents an
extension of the model. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendices.
2 The Model
Preferences and Prior Beliefs: Players are expected utility maximizers. The receiver selects
an action a from a compact set A. The sender and the receiver have preferences over
actions characterized by continuous von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions uS(a, θ)
and uR(a, θ), with θ ∈ Θ and Θ a finite state space, common to both players.
Both players are initially uncertain about the realization of the state θ. A key aspect
of our model is that players openly disagree about the likelihood of θ. Following Aumann
(1976), this implies that rational players must then hold different prior beliefs.8 Thus, let the
receiver’s prior be pR =
(
pRθ
)
θ∈Θ and the sender’s prior be p
S =
(
pSθ
)
θ∈Θ. We assume that p
R
and pS belong to the interior of the simplex ∆ (Θ) - that is, players have prior beliefs that
are “totally mixed,” as they have full support.9 This assumption will avoid known issues of
8See Morris (1994, 1995) and Van den Steen (2010b, 2011) for an analysis of the sources of heterogeneous
priors and extended discussions of their role in economic theory.
9Actually, our results require only that players’ prior beliefs have a common support, which may be a
strict subset of Θ. Assuming a full support eases the exposition without any loss of generality.
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non-convergence of posterior beliefs when belief distributions fail to be absolutely continuous
with respect to each other (see Blackwell and Dubins, 1962, and Kalai and Lehrer, 1994).
In our base model, prior beliefs are common knowledge. We extend the base model
in Section 5 to the case in which players’ prior beliefs are drawn from some distribution
H(pR, pS). Depending on the support of this distribution, belief disagreement may not be
common knowledge among players.
It is natural to inquire whether the sources of heterogeneous priors affect the way in
which players process new information. For instance, mistakes in information processing
will eventually lead players to different posterior beliefs, but will also call Bayesian updating
into question. We take the view that players are Bayes rational, but may initially openly
disagree on the likelihood of the state. This disagreement can come, for example, from a lack
of experimental evidence or historical records that would otherwise allow players to reach
a consensus on their prior views.10 Disagreement can also come from Bayesian players that
misperceive the extent to which others are differentially informed (Camerer, Lowenstein and
Weber, 1989). For instance, the receiver may fail to realize that the sender had private
information when selecting an experiment. A privately informed sender who is aware of this
perception bias will then select an experiment as if players openly disagreed about the state.
Strategic Experimentation: All players process information according to Bayes’ rule. The
receiver observes the realization of an experiment pi, updates his belief, and chooses an action.
The sender can affect this action through the design of pi. To be specific, an experiment pi
consists of a finite realization space Z and a family of likelihood functions over Z, {pi (·|θ)}θ∈Θ,
with pi (·|θ) ∈ ∆(Z). Note that whether or not the realization is observed by the sender does
not affect the receiver’s actions.
Key to our analysis is that pi is a “commonly understood experiment”: the receiver ob-
serves the sender’s choice of pi, and all players agree on the likelihoods pi (·|θ).11 Common
10In fact, as argued by Van den Steen (2011), the Bayesian model specifies how new information is to be
processed, but, is largely silent on how priors should be (or actually are) formed. Lacking a rational basis for
selecting a prior, the assumption that individuals should, nevertheless, all agree on one may seem unfounded.
11Our assumption of a commonly understood experiment is similar to the notion of “concordant beliefs”
in Morris (1994). Morris (1994) indicates that “beliefs are concordant if they agree about everything except
the prior probability of payoff-relevant states.” Technically, his definition requires both agreement over the
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agreement over pi generates substantial congruence: if all players knew the actual realization
of the state, then they would all agree on the likelihood of observing each z ∈ Z for any
experiment pi.12
We make two important assumptions regarding the set of available experiments. First,
the sender can choose any experiment that is correlated with the state. Thus, our setup
provides an upper bound on the sender’s benefit from persuasion in a setting with a more
restricted space of experiments. Second, experiments are costless to the sender. This is not a
serious limitation if all experiments impose the same cost, and would not affect the sender’s
choice if she decides to experiment. However, the optimal experiment may change if different
experiments impose different costs.13
Our setup is related to models that study agents’ incentives to affect others’ learning -
e.g., through “signal jamming,” as in Holmstro¨m’s model of career concerns (Holmstro¨m,
1999), or through obfuscation, as in Ellison and Ellison (2009). In contrast to this literature,
the sender in our model shapes the receiver’s learning through the statistical specification of a
public experiment. For instance, rating systems and product certification fit this framework,
with consumers observing an aggregate measure of the underlying quality of firms/products.
Quality tests provide another example, as a firm may not know the quality of each single
product, but can control the likelihood that a test detects a defective product.
In our model of strategic experimentation, the sender has no private information when
selecting an experiment. As KG show, this model is isomorphic to a model in which a sender
can commit to a disclosure rule before becoming privately informed - i.e., commit to how
her knowledge will map to her advice. It is also equivalent to models in which a sender is
required to certifiably disclosed her knowledge while being free to choose what she actually
learns (Gentzkow and Kamenica, 2014b).
Our focus is on understanding when and how the sender benefits from experimentation.
conditional distribution of an experiment’s realizations, given the state, and that each player assigns positive
probability to each realization. Our assumptions of a commonly understood experiment and totally mixed
priors imply that players’ beliefs are concordant in our setup.
12See Van den Steen (2011) and Acemoglu et al. (2006) for models in which players also disagree on the
informativeness of experiments.
13Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014a) offer an initial exploration of persuasion with costly experiments, where
the cost of an experiment is given by the expected Shannon entropy of the beliefs that it induces.
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Given pi, for a realization z that induces the profile of posterior beliefs (qS(z), qR(z)), the
receiver’s choice in any Perfect Bayesian equilibrium must satisfy
a(qR(z)) ∈ arg max
a∈A
∑
θ∈Θ
qRθ (z)uR(a, θ),
while the corresponding (subjective) expected utility of the sender after z is realized is∑
θ∈Θ
qSθ (z)uS(a(q
R(z)), θ).
We restrict attention to equilibria in which the receiver’s choice depends only on his pos-
terior belief induced by the observed realization. To this end, we define a language-invariant
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium as a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which for all experiments
pi and pi′, and realizations z and z′ for which qR(z) = qR(z′), the receiver selects the same
action (or the same probability distribution over actions). Our focus on language-invariant
equilibria allows us to abstract from the particular realization. Given an equilibrium a(·),
we define the sender’s expected payoff v when players hold beliefs (qS, qR) as
v(qS, qR) ≡
∑
θ∈Θ
qSθ uS(a(q
R), θ), with a(qR) ∈ arg max
a∈A
∑
θ∈Θ
qRθ uR(a, θ). (1)
We concentrate on equilibria for which the function v is upper-semicontinuous. This class
of equilibria is non-empty: an equilibrium in which the receiver selects an action that max-
imizes the sender’s expected utility whenever he is indifferent between actions is a (sender-
preferred) language-invariant equilibrium for which v is upper-semicontinous.14 Given a
language-invariant equilibrium that induces v, let Vpi be the sender’s expected payoff from
experiment pi, given prior beliefs. The sender’s equilibrium expected utility is simply
V (pS, pR) = max
pi
Vpi(p
S, pR) = max
pi
EpiS
[
v(qS(z), qR(z))
]
, (2)
where the maximum is computed over all possible experiments pi. An optimal experiment
pi∗ is such that Vpi∗(pS, pR) = V (pS, pR). We can then define the value of persuasion as the
sender’s equilibrium expected gain when, in the absence of experimentation, the receiver
would remain uninformed; it is given by V (pS, pR)− v(pS, pR).
14As noted in KG, this follows from Berge’s maximum theorem. Upper-semicontinuity will prove convenient
when establishing the existence of an optimal experiment.
10
Timing: The sender selects pi after which the receiver observes a realization z ∈ Z, updates
his beliefs according to Bayes’ rule, selects an action, payoffs are realized and the game ends.
We focus on language-invariant perfect equilibria for which v is upper-semicontinuous.
We have been silent regarding the true distribution governing the realization of θ. As
our analysis is primarily positive and considers only the sender’s choice of an experiment,
we remain agnostic as to the true distribution of the state.
Notational Conventions: Let card(A) denote the cardinality of the set A. For vectors s, t ∈
RN , let st be the component-wise product of s and t; that is, (st)i = siti, and let 〈s, t〉
represent the standard inner product in RN , 〈s, t〉 = ∑Ni=1 siti. As ours is a setup with
heterogeneous priors, this notation proves convenient when computing expectations for which
we need to specify both the information set and the individual whose perspective we are
adopting. We will often refer to the subspace W of “marginal beliefs,” defined as
W =
{
w ∈ RN : 〈1, w〉 = 0} . (3)
This terminology follows from the fact that the difference between any two beliefs must lie
in W . Also, we will denote by s||W the orthogonal projection of s onto W .
Let rSθ =
pSθ
pRθ
and rRθ =
pRθ
pSθ
be the state-θ likelihood ratios of prior beliefs. We then define
rS = (rSθ )θ∈Θ =
(
pSθ
pRθ
)
θ∈Θ
and rR = (rRθ )θ∈Θ =
(
pRθ
pSθ
)
θ∈Θ
. (4)
Given pi, we denote by PrS[z] and PrS[z] the probabilities of realization z obtained from the
sender’s and the receiver’s beliefs, and define the likelihood-ratios over realizations
λSz ≡
PrS[z]
PrR[z]
and λRz ≡
PrR[z]
PrS[z]
. (5)
3 The Value of Persuasion under Open Disagreement
When does the sender benefit from experimentation? We show that, when the experiment is
commonly understood, the posterior belief of one player can be obtained from that of another
player without explicit knowledge of the actual experiment. This allows us to characterize
the (subjective) distributions of posterior beliefs that can be induced by any experiment
(Proposition 1). It also enables us to translate the search for an optimal experiment to an
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auxiliary problem - where the belief of each player is expressed in terms of the belief of a
reference player- and then apply the techniques developed in KG to solve it (Proposition 2).
We obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for a sender to benefit from experimentation
(Corollary 1), and for a sender to select a fully informative experiment (Corollary 2).
3.1 Induced Distributions of Posterior Beliefs
From the sender’s perspective, each experiment pi induces a (subjective) distribution over
profiles of posterior beliefs. In any language-invariant equilibrium, the receiver’s posterior
belief uniquely determines his action. Thus, knowledge of the distribution of posterior beliefs
suffices to compute the sender’s expected utility from pi.
If players share a common prior p, KG show that the martingale property of posterior
beliefs Epi[q] = p is both necessary and sufficient to characterize the set of distributions of
beliefs that can be induced in Bayesian rational players by some experiment. This leads
us to ask: when players hold heterogeneous priors, what is the set of joint distributions
of posterior beliefs that are consistent with Bayesian rationality? While the martingale
property still holds when a player evaluates the induced distribution of his own posterior
beliefs, it is no longer true that the sender’s expectation over the receiver’s posterior belief
always equals the receiver’s prior. Nevertheless, we next show that posteriors qS and qR
form a bijection — qR is derived from qS through a perspective transformation. Moreover,
this transformation is independent of the experiment pi and realization z.
Proposition 1 Let the prior beliefs of the sender and the receiver be the totally mixed beliefs
pS and pR, and let rR =
(
rRθ
)
θ∈Θ be the likelihood-ratio defined by (4). From the sender’s
perspective, a distribution over profiles of posterior beliefs τ ∈ ∆ (∆ (Θ)×∆ (Θ)) is induced
by some experiment if and only if
(i) if (qS, qR) ∈ Supp(τ), then
qRθ = q
S
θ
rRθ∑
θ′∈Θ q
S
θ′r
R
θ′
=
qSθ r
R
θ
〈qS, rR〉 . (6)
(ii) Eτ [q
S] = pS.
Proposition 1 establishes that the martingale property of the sender’s beliefs and the
perspective transformation (6), together, characterize the set of distributions of posterior
12
beliefs that are consistent with Bayesian rationality. It also shows that, in spite of the de-
grees of freedom afforded by heterogeneous priors, not all distributions are consistent with
Bayesian rationality. Indeed, any two experiments that induce the same marginal distribu-
tion over the sender’s posterior must necessarily induce the same marginal distribution over
the receiver’s posteriors.15 In fact, (6) implies that the set of joint distributions of players
posterior beliefs under common priors and heterogeneous priors form a bijection. That is,
belief disagreement does not generate “more ways” to persuade the receiver. Equation (6)
relies on both the assumptions of common support of priors and a commonly understood
experiment. One implication of a common support of priors is that any realization that
leads the receiver to revise his belief must also induce a belief update by the sender — a
realization is uninformative to the receiver if and only if it is uninformative to the sender.
Expression (6) affords a simple interpretation. Heterogeneous priors over θ imply that,
for given pi, with realization space Z, players also disagree on how likely they are to observe
each z ∈ Z. Just as the prior disagreement between the receiver and the sender is encoded in
the likelihood ratio rRθ = p
R
θ /p
S
θ , we can encode the disagreement over z in the likelihood ratio
λRz = PrR(z)/PrS(z), defined by (5). The proof of Proposition 1 shows that this likelihood
ratio can be obtained from rR by
λRz =
〈
qS(z), rR
〉
. (7)
From (6) and (7), we can relate the updated likelihood ratio qRθ (z)/q
S
θ (z) to r
R and λRz ,
qRθ (z)
qSθ (z)
=
rRθ
λRz
. (8)
In words, the state-θ likelihood ratio after updating based on z is the ratio of the likelihood
ratio over states to the likelihood ratio over realizations. This implies that a realization z
that comes more as a “surprise” to the receiver than to the sender (so λRz < 1) would lead to
a larger revision of the receiver’s beliefs and, thus, a component-wise increase in the updated
likelihood ratio. Moreover, both likelihood ratios (rRθ and λ
R
z ) are positively related, in the
15When players disagree on the likelihood functions that describe pi (as is the case in Acemoglu et al.,
2006 and Van den Steen, 2011), then, even for Bayesian players, knowledge of the marginal distribution of
posterior beliefs of one player may not be enough to infer the entire joint distribution, and, thus, it may not
be enough to compute the sender’s expected utility from pi.
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sense that realizations that come more as a surprise to the receiver than to the sender are
associated with states that the receiver perceives as less likely.16
As a final remark, note that the likelihood ratio rR is the Radon-Nikodym derivative
of pR with respect to pS. Therefore, (6) states that Bayesian updating under a commonly
understood experiment simply induces a linear scaling of the Radon-Nikodym derivative,
where the proportionality factor does not depend on the experiment pi.
3.2 Value of Persuasion
If τ ∈ ∆ (∆ (Θ)×∆ (Θ)) is a distribution over (qS, qR), then the sender’s problem is
V (pS, pR) = sup
pi
EpiS
[
v(qS(z), qR(z))
]
(9)
s.t. τ is induced by pi,
where τ obtains from pi and the sender’s prior pS, and the receiver’s posterior qR follows
from applying Bayes’ rule to the prior pR. Proposition 1 allows us to translate (9) to the
following equivalent, but lower dimensional, optimization problem,
V (pS, pR) = sup
σ
Eσ
[
v(qS, qR)
]
(10)
s.t. σ ∈ ∆ (∆ (Θ)) ,Eσ
[
qS
]
= pS, qR =
qSrR
〈qS, rR〉 ,
By writing all posterior beliefs as a function of the beliefs of a reference player (in (10), the
reference player is the sender), then (10) becomes amenable to the tools developed in KG.
16Formally, given experiment pi, consider the probability distribution ζj(θ, z) in Θ×Z defined by ζj(θ, z) =
pi(z|θ)pjθ. Define the random variables ri(θ, z) = riθ and λi(θ, z) = λiz. Then, ri and λi are positively (linearly)
correlated under ζj(θ, z). To see this, note that
Eζi
[
λiri
]
=
∑
z∈Z
∑
θ∈Θ
〈
pi(z), pi
〉
〈pi(z), pj〉
piθ
pjθ
pi(z|θ)pjθ =
∑
z∈Z
(〈
pi(z), pi
〉
〈pi(z), pj〉
)2 〈
pi(z), pj
〉
,
≥
(∑
z∈Z
〈
pi(z), pi
〉
〈pi(z), pj〉
〈
pi(z), pj
〉)2
= 1,
Eζi
[
ri
]
=
∑
z∈Z
∑
θ∈Θ
piθ
pjθ
pi(z|θ)pjθ = 1,
Eζi
[
λi
]
=
∑
z∈Z
∑
θ∈Θ
〈
pi(z), pi
〉
〈pi(z), pj〉pi(z|θ)p
j
θ =
∑
z∈Z
〈
pi(z), pi
〉
= 1.
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The next proposition provides properties of optimal experiments. For this purpose, and
following KG, for an arbitrary real-valued function f, define f˜ as the concave closure of f ,
f˜(q) = sup {w|(q, w) ∈ co(f)} ,
where co(f) is the convex hull of the graph of f . In other words, f˜ is the smallest upper
semicontinuous and concave function that (weakly) majorizes the function f .
Proposition 2 (i) An optimal experiment exists. Furthermore, there exists an optimal ex-
periment with realization space Z such that card(Z) ≤ min{card(A), card(Θ)}.
(ii) Define the function VS by
VS
(
qS
)
= v
(
qS,
qSrR
〈qS, rR〉
)
. (11)
The sender’s expected utility under an optimal experiment is
V (pS, pR) = V˜S
(
pS
)
. (12)
Expression (12) implies that the value of persuasion is V˜S
(
pS
)−VS (pS). Direct applica-
tion of Proposition 2 to establish whether this value is positive would require the derivation of
the concave closure of an upper-semicontinous function. Nevertheless, the following corollary
provides conditions that make it easier to verify whether experimentation is valuable.
Corollary 1 There is no value of persuasion if and only if there exists a vector γ ∈ Rcard(Θ)
such that 〈
γ, qS − pS〉 ≥ VS (qS)− VS (pS) , qS ∈ ∆ (Θ) . (13)
In particular, if VS is differentiable at p
S, then there is no value of persuasion if and only if〈∇VS (pS) , qS − pS〉 ≥ VS (qS)− VS (pS) , qS ∈ ∆ (Θ) . (14)
This corollary provides a geometric condition for the value of persuasion to be zero: a
sender does not benefit from experimentation if and only if VS admits a supporting hyper-
plane at pS. This observation is based on the characterization of concave functions as the
infimum of affine functions, and Figure 1 depicts this insight graphically.
If (13) is violated, then the sender will choose to experiment. Corollary 2 shows when
the sender will choose an experiment that perfectly reveals the state. For this purpose, let
1θ be the posterior belief that puts probability 1 on state θ.
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VS (q
S )
pS qS
(a) No Value of Persuasion
VS (q
S )
pS qS
(b) Positive Value of Persuasion
Figure 1: Illustration of Corollary 1
Corollary 2 A perfectly informative experiment is optimal if and only if∑
θ∈Θ
qSθ uS(a(1θ), θ) ≥ VS
(
qS
)
, qS ∈ ∆ (Θ) . (15)
Condition (15) admits a simple interpretation. Suppose that players observe a realization
that induces qS in the sender. The right-hand side of (15) is the sender’s expected utility if
she discloses no more information, while the left-hand side of (15) is the sender’s expected
utility if she allows the receiver to perfectly learn the state. Then, a sender does not benefit
from garbling a perfectly informative experiment if and only if for every possible experiment
pi and realization z, she is not worse off by fully revealing the state.
In some applications, it will be convenient to rewrite the sender’s problem as follows. De-
fine uˇS(a, θ) = uS(a, θ)r
S
θ , where the likelihood ratio r
S
θ is defined by (4). For any experiment
pi = (Z, {pi (·|θ)}θ∈Θ) and receiver’s decision rule a(z), z ∈ Z, we have
ES [uS(a(z), θ)] =
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
z∈Z
pi(z|θ)pSθ uS(a(z), θ) =
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
z∈Z
pi(z|θ)pRθ uS(a(z), θ)rSθ = ER [uˇS(a(z), θ)] .
That is, the expected utility of a sender with prior pS and utility uS is the same as the
expected utility of a sender who shares the receiver’s prior pR, but has utility uˇS. Thus,
under a commonly understood experiment, one can convert the original problem to one with
common priors as follows. Rewrite (1) as vˇ
(
qS, qR
) ≡∑θ∈Θ qSθ uˇS(a(qR), θ), and define
VR
(
qR
)
= vˇ
(
qR, qR
)
. (16)
Remark: The claims of Proposition 2 remain valid if one substitutes VR
(
qR
)
for VS
(
qS
)
.
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Note, however, that in many cases, the transformed utility uˇS is hard to interpret and
defend on economic grounds. Moreover, by maintaining the original formulation, one is able
to gather a better economic understanding of the implications of heterogeneous priors. For
example, an important result in Section 4 is that on the space of pairs of prior beliefs, the
sender generically benefits from persuasion. Such a result would be hard to postulate and
interpret if one examined only the transformed problem.
4 Skeptics and Believers
How might a sender gain from designing a receiver’s access to information? The literature has
explored two broad sources of value under the assumption of a common prior. One source is
based on the value of information: a sender who benefits from decisions that are adapted to
the underlying state would certainly benefit from providing an informative experiment to a
decision maker that shares her preferences. The other source is based on conflicting interests.
For instance, if the sender’s utility is independent of the state — “pure persuasion” —, then
she would draw no value from learning the state if she could make decisions herself. However,
KG and Brocas and Carrillo (2007) show that she can still benefit from experimentation if,
instead, it is a receiver who makes decisions — when players share a common prior, the
sender can exploit non-concavities in the receiver’s action or in her own utility.
Van den Steen (2004, 2010a) and Che and Kartik (2009) show that the presence of het-
erogeneous priors can increase the incentives of influencers to persuade a decision maker
who holds unfavorable beliefs. In this paper, we explore the extent to which open disagree-
ment provides a third, distinct rationale for a sender to benefit from experimentation. To
be sure, there are situations in which belief disagreement does not lead to experimentation.
Proposition 3 provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the sender not to benefit from
persuasion for every pair of mixed prior beliefs (pR, pS). We then provide sufficient conditions
for the sender to benefit from persuasion for almost every pair of prior beliefs. Our main
condition is that the receiver’s action depends on his beliefs only through his expectation
of some random variable. In this case, belief disagreement generically induces the sender to
experiment, even when there is no value of persuasion under a common prior. Moreover, the
optimal experiment is often not fully revealing of the state.
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4.1 No Positive Value of Persuasion
We can express the sender’s payoff VR
(
qR
)
in (16) as
VR
(
qR
)
=
∑
θ∈Θ
pSθ
pRθ
qRθ uS
(
a(qR), θ
)
. (17)
With common prior beliefs, KG show that there is no value of persuasion for every pair of
common priors if and only if the expectation
∑
θ∈Θ q
R
θ uS
(
a(qR), θ
)
is everywhere concave in
qR. With heterogeneous priors, this condition must be satisfied for each possible state.
Proposition 3 The value of persuasion is zero for every pair of mixed prior beliefs if and
only if for each state θ, the function qRθ uS
(
a(qR), θ
)
is everywhere concave in qR .
The following example illustrates Proposition 3.
Example 1: Let Θ = {θL, θH}, with θL < θH . Consider quadratic payoffs uR = −(a−θ)2 and
uS = −(a−f(θ))2, where f captures the possible misalignment in preferences. The receiver’s
optimal action is, then, a(qR) = ER[θ]. Using the condition from Proposition 3, the value of
persuasion is zero for every pair of prior beliefs if and only if f(θH) ≤ θL < θH ≤ f(θL). 
The example shows that heterogeneous priors may not be enough for senders to engage
in experimentation. In the example, this result follows from two forces. First, an application
of Proposition 1 to a binary state shows that any realization that makes the receiver more
optimistic about the state being θH also leads the sender to raise the likelihood of θH . Second,
when f(θH) ≤ θL < θH ≤ f(θL), the misalignment in preferences is extreme: the receiver
would choose a higher action if he is more confident that θ = θH , while the sender would
prefer a lower action if θ = θH becomes more likely. Overall, the receiver would adversely
adjust his action after any realization of any experiment, regardless of the prior disagreement.
4.2 Generic Positive Value of Persuasion
Consider the following model of persuasion. Let A,Θ ⊂ R. Our main assumption is that
the receiver’s action depends on his beliefs only through his expectation of some random
variable, which we take to be the state θ. Formally, a(qR) = F
(〈
qR, θ
〉)
, with F twice
18
continuously differentiable. We normalize the receiver’s action by incorporating F into the
sender’s payoff:
(A1): The receiver’s action is a(qR) =
〈
qR, θ
〉
.
(A2): The sender’s payoff uS(a, θ) is a twice continuously differentiable function of a.
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In Section 4.5, we provide a series of economic applications in which both assumptions hold.
Our first result is a sufficient condition for the sender to benefit from experimentation.
We start by listing some definitions. For each state θ, let
u′S,θ ≡
∂uS(a, θ)
∂a
∣∣∣∣
a=〈pR,θ〉
be the sender’s state-contingent marginal utility at the receiver’s action chosen at his prior
belief. Define the vector u′S ≡
(
u′S,θ
)
θ∈Θ. Finally, we recall the following definition.
Definition: Vectors v and w are negatively collinear with respect to the subspace W , defined
by (3), if there exist λ < 0 such that the projections18 v||W and w||W satisfy
v||W = λw||W . (18)
We now state our first proposition in this section.
Proposition 4 Suppose that (A1) and (A2) hold. If (i)
(
rS · u′S
)
||W 6= 0, and (ii) rS · u′S
and θ are not negatively collinear with respect to W , then the sender benefits from persuasion.
Conditions (i) and (ii) are easy to illustrate. For each state θ, we plot the point (θ, rSθ u
′
S,θ)
on a two-dimensional graph. Condition (i) is violated if and only if all points fall on a single
horizontal line (see Figure 2(a))— that is, if the term rSθ u
′
S,θ is constant across all states.
Condition (ii) is violated if and only if all points fall on a single line with a strictly negative
slope19 (see Figure 2(b)). Figures 2(c) to (f) provide examples in which both conditions are
satisfied; hence, the sender benefits from persuasion.
17It is immediate to rewrite our results for the case a(qR) = F
(〈
qR, x(θ)
〉)
, so that x(θ) is the random
variable relevant to defining the receiver’s action, and θ is the random variable relevant to the sender’s payoff.
18Given vector v = (v1, . . . , vN ), the projection v||W captures the deviation of each element of v from the
mean of the elements of v: v||W = (v1 −
∑N
n=1 vn/N, . . . , vN −
∑N
n=1 vn/N).
19For example, recall Example 1 from Section 4.1. Condition (ii) is violated whenever (rSθHu
′
S,θH
−
rSθLu
′
S,θL
) < 0. If f(θH) ≤ θL < θH ≤ f(θL), then u′S,θH < 0 and u′S,θL > 0 for every prior belief of
the receiver. Hence, (rSθHu
′
S,θH
− rSθLu′S,θL) < 0 for all rS (for every pair of prior beliefs).
19
● ● ● ● ●
θ
rSθ u'S,θ
(a) Condition (i) violated
● ● ●
● ● θ
rSθ u'S,θ
(b) Condition (ii) violated
● ●
●
● ●
θ
rSθ u'S,θ
(c) Conditions met
● ● ● ● ●
θ
rSθ u'S,θ
(d) Conditions met
● ● ● ●
● θ
rSθ u'S,θ
(e) Conditions met
●
●
● ●
● θ
rSθ u'S,θ
(f) Conditions met
Figure 2: Illustration of Conditions (i) and (ii) from Proposition 4
In the proof of Proposition 4, we exploit (16), which is the sender’s payoff as a function
of the receiver’s belief, VR(q
R). The vector rS · u′S then represents the sender’s expected
marginal utility evaluated according to the receiver’s prior belief:
ES
[
u′S|pS
]
= 〈pS, u′s〉 = 〈pR · rS, u′s〉 = 〈pR, rS · u′s〉 = ER
[
rS · u′S|pR
]
. (19)
Thus,
(
rS · u′S
)
||W is the direction in the space of the receiver’s beliefs along of highest
rate of increase of the sender’s expected utility. Likewise, θ||W provides the direction in
the space of the receiver’s beliefs along which his expectation of θ, and, hence, his action,
increases at the highest rate. Proposition 4 then states that the sender benefits from strategic
experimentation whenever these two directions are not opposite to each other.20 In this case,
the proof of Proposition 4 shows that there exists a direction such that the sender’s payoff
VR is locally strictly convex at p
R.
We now provide further intuition for Proposition 4. To do so, we construct a binary
experiment that improves upon non-experimentation whenever rS·u′S and θ are not negatively
collinear with respect to W . Intuitively, this binary experiment increases the receiver’s action
20Note that Proposition 4 also applies to the case of common prior beliefs, so that rS = 1. In this case,
the sender benefits from experimentation if u′S||W and θ||W are not negatively collinear.
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only for beliefs where the sender’s expected marginal utility is higher than under her prior
belief.
pR E[θ |qR]=E[θ |pR]
E[rSu'S|qR]=E[rSu'S|pR]
rSu'S||W
θ||W
● ●qR+ qR-
●
●
qR+
qR-
θ1 θ2
θ3
Figure 3: Finding a Beneficial Experiment
Figure 3 provides a graphical illustration of this beneficial experiment, which we construct
in two steps. Consider, first, a binary experiment pˆi with two equally likely outcomes that
do not change the receiver’s prior action. That is, under pˆi, the receiver can have one of two
posterior beliefs, qˆR+ = p
R + w and qˆR− = p
R − w, where 〈qˆR+ − pR, θ〉 = 〈w, θ〉 = 0. Clearly,
the sender does not benefit from this experiment and Vpˆi = 0. Starting with pˆi, consider,
now, a binary experiment pi that induces one of two equally likely beliefs in the receiver,
qR+ = qˆ
R
+ + εθ‖W and q
R
− = qˆ
R
− − εθ‖W , with ε > 0. Under pi, the receiver changes his action
by ∆a = a(qR+) − a(pR) = ε
∥∥θ‖W ∥∥2 if the realization induces qR+ and by −∆a if it induces
qR−. To understand the sender’s gain from pi, we compare the sender’s expected gain from
21
the realizations qR+ under pi and realization qˆ
R
+ under pˆi
V +pi − V +pˆi = Pr S
[
qR+
]
ES[uS(a
(
qR+
)
, θ)]− Pr S
[
qˆR+
]
ES[uS(a
(
qˆR+
)
, θ)]
= Pr R
[
qR+
]
ER[r
SuS(a
(
qR+
)
, θ)|qR+]− Pr R
[
qˆR+
]
ES[r
SuS(a
(
qˆR+
)
, θ)|qˆR+]
≈ 1
2
(〈
qˆR+, r
S ∂uS
∂a
(a
(
pR
)
, θ)
〉
∆a+ ε
〈
θ‖W , rSuS(a
(
pR
)
, θ)
〉)
.
The first term is the change in the sender’s expected utility from increasing the receiver’s
action by ∆a at belief qˆR+, while the second term gives the change in the sender’s utility
from the difference (from the sender’s perspective) in the likelihood of qR+ relative to qˆ
R
+. A
similar analysis can be performed to compare the sender’s expected gain under realization
qR− under pi relative to realization qˆ
R
− under pˆi. Combining these two calculations, we have,
after eliminating second-order terms21
Vpi = Vpi − Vpˆi = V +pi − V +pˆi + V −pi − V −pˆi
=
1
2
(〈
qˆR+ − qˆR−, rS
∂uS
∂a
(a
(
pR
)
, θ)
〉
∆a+ ε
〈
θ‖W , rS
(
uS(a
(
qR+
)
, θ)− uS(a
(
qR−
)
, θ)
)〉)
≈ 〈w, rSu′S〉∆a (20)
Recall that the vector w ∈ W is orthogonal to θ and (rS · u′S)||W 6= 0. Therefore, (20) is
identically zero if and only if
(
rS · u′S
)
||W and θ||W are collinear. If
(
rS · u′S
)
||W and θ||W are
not collinear, however, one can find a vector w that makes (20) positive. Intuitively, under
experiment pi, it is more valuable for the sender to raise the receiver’s action at qˆR+ and less
valuable at qˆR−, relative to the prior belief p
R. Then, experiment pi raises the sender’s utility,
as it induces the receiver to increase his action only for the realization for which the sender
benefits relatively more from a higher action.
How often does the sender benefit from persuading the receiver? Our next result es-
tablishes sufficient conditions for the sender to generically benefit from persuasion, where
genericity is interpreted over the space of pairs of prior beliefs. First, the state space must
be sufficiently rich, card (Θ) > 2. Moreover, we assume
21The second-order term that we eliminate is ε
〈
θ‖W , rS ∂uS∂a (a
(
pR
)
, θ)
〉
∆a, which captures the change in
the sender’s utility owing to the relative difference in the probability of qR+ and qˆ
R
+ versus q
R
− and qˆ
R
−. The
first-order term in (20) is zero if (rS ·u′S)||W and θ||W are collinear. In this case, this second-order term is posi-
tive, and, thus, the sender benefits from experiment pi if θ‖W and rS ∂uS∂a (a
(
pR
)
, θ)‖W are positively collinear.
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(A3): For almost every belief pR, we have ∂uS(a,θ)
∂a
∣∣∣
a=〈pR,θ〉
6= 0 for at least one θ.
Assumption (A3) implies that for a generic prior belief of the receiver, changing the
receiver’s action marginally changes the sender’s state-contingent payoff for at least one state.
Condition (A3) holds in all applications of Section 4.5. Together, assumptions card (Θ) > 2
and (A3) guarantee that both conditions (i) and (ii) from Proposition 4 hold generically.
Corollary 3 Suppose that (A1) and (A2) hold. If card (Θ) > 2 and (A3) hold, then the
sender generically benefits from persuasion.
A remarkable feature of Corollary 3 is that it does not impose conditions on the alignment
of preferences between sender and receiver. Given a rich state space and conditions (A1) to
(A3), the sender can generically find a beneficial experiment to provide to the receiver even
under extreme conflict of preferences — e.g., even if uS(a, θ) = −uR(a, θ).
4.3 Pure Persuasion and Skeptics and Believers
In a world of common prior beliefs, KG describe how the value of persuasion fundamentally
depends on the curvature of a sender’s payoff as a function of the receiver’s beliefs. In a world
of heterogeneous prior beliefs, our Corollary 3 shows that if the state space is sufficiently
rich and conditions (A1) to (A3) hold, then the sender generically benefits from persuasion.
Furthermore, our conditions do not impose significant restrictions on the curvature of the
sender’s payoff other than smoothness.
Why is experimentation pervasive under open disagreement? To isolate the role of belief
disagreement in strategic experimentation, we focus on the case of pure persuasion, in which
the sender’s utility is independent of the state:
(A2′): The sender’s payoff is uS(a, θ) = G(a), with G twice continuously differentiable
and G′ > 0.
In this case, the sender benefits from the receiver choosing a higher action, which occurs
whenever he has a higher expectation of θ. We can then categorize as follows the type
of receiver that the sender may face. A sender views a receiver as a skeptic if the sender
would be made better off by a receiver who shares her point of view; that is, if
〈
qR, θ
〉
<
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〈
qS, θ
〉
.Conversely, a sender views a receiver as a believer if the sender would not be made
better off by a like-minded receiver; that is, if
〈
qR, θ
〉 ≥ 〈qS, θ〉 .
From the sender’s point of view, a fully revealing experiment increases the average action
of an skeptic receiver, and (weakly) decreases that of a believer. Whether such experiments
raise or decrease the sender’s expected utility depends on her risk preferences, as captured by
the curvature of G. Nevertheless, together, conditions (A1), (A2′) and card(Θ) > 2 imply
that all conditions of Corollary 3 hold. Thus, persuasion is generically valuable, regardless
of whether the sender is facing a skeptic or a believer, and regardless of her risk attitude.
We now derive a more intuitive interpretation of our collinearity condition in Proposition
4 when applied to the case of pure persuasion. We start by defining some relevant sets of
beliefs. Let the set of beneficial beliefs A+ be the set of the receiver’s beliefs that would
result in his choosing a (weakly) higher action than under the prior belief pR, and A− be the
set of detrimental beliefs. That is,
A+ =
{
qR ∈ ∆(θ)| 〈qR, θ〉 ≥ 〈pR, θ〉} , (21)
A− =
{
qR ∈ ∆(θ)| 〈qR, θ〉 < 〈pR, θ〉} .
Thus, the sender faces a skeptic if and only if pS ∈ A+. Figure 4(a) depicts the sets of
beneficial beliefs (gray area) and detrimental beliefs (white area).
Recall that players disagree on the likelihood of reaching certain posterior beliefs. It fol-
lows from (7) that for every qR ∈ ∆(Θ), we have PrS[qR] = PrR[qR]〈qR, rS〉. We say that the
receiver underestimates qR if PrS[q
R] > PrR[q
R], and he overestimates qR if PrS[q
R] < PrR[q
R].
We then define the sets of beliefs:
S+ = {qR ∈ ∆(θ)|〈qR, rS〉 > 1},
S− = {qR ∈ ∆(θ)|〈qR, rS〉 < 1}.
For every qR in the support of pi, the receiver underestimates qR if and only if qR ∈ S+, and
he overestimates qR if and only if qR ∈ S−. Hence, we refer to S+ as the set of beliefs that
the receiver underestimates. Figure 4(b) depicts a series of hyperplanes along which 〈qR, rS〉
is constant. The gray area depicts S+ and the white area depicts S−.
Given (A1) and (A2′), note that the derivative ∂uS(a,θ)
∂a
= G′(a) > 0 is independent of
the state; hence, all elements of u′S are the same. In this case, conditions (i) and (ii) of
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Proposition 4 afford a simple interpretation.
Lemma 1 Suppose that (A1) and (A2′) hold. Then, the set of beneficial beliefs that the
receiver underestimates is non-empty, A+ ∩ S+ 6= ∅, if and only if (i) prior beliefs are not
common, and (ii) rS and θ are not negatively collinear with respect to W .
A+
A-
θ||W
pR
E[θ |qR]=E[θ |pR]
E[θ |qR]>E[θ |pR]
E[θ |qR]<E[θ |pR]
θ1 θ2
θ3
(a) Beneficial beliefs
S+ S-
rS||W pR
E[rS|qR]=1
E[rS|qR]>1 E[rS|qR]<1
θ1 θ2
θ3
(b) Beliefs underestimated by the receiver
rS||W
A+ ⋂ S+
pR
E[θ |qR]=E[θ |pR]
E[rS|qR]=1
A- ⋂ S-
θ||W
θ1 θ2
θ3
(c) Non-empty set A+ ∩ S+
Figure 4: Finding a Beneficial Experiment.
Figure 4(c) describes the intersection of the sets A+ and S+ graphically. As the projec-
tions of θ and rS are not negatively collinear, A+ ∩ S+ is non-empty, and one can readily
find posterior beliefs that are beneficial and that the sender perceives to be more likely.22
22To further highlight the importance of the sets A+ and S+, suppose thatG is linear. Take any experiment
pi that is supported only by beliefs in the areas A+ ∩ S+ and A− ∩ S−. Then, the sender strictly prefers to
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We can now extend Proposition 4 by providing both necessary and sufficient conditions
for a positive value of persuasion.
Proposition 5 Suppose that (A1) and (A2′) hold.
(i) If A+ ∩ S+ 6= ∅, then the sender benefits from persuasion.
(ii) If the sender’s payoff G is concave, then she benefits from persuasion if and only if
A+ ∩ S+ 6= ∅.
Proposition 5(i) shows that the sender will experiment as long as there are beneficial
beliefs underestimated by the receiver. Proposition 5(ii) then shows that if the sender’s
utility is a concave function of the receiver’s expectation, so that experimentation is never
valuable under a common prior, then the only reason for experimentation is that the sender
is more optimistic about some beneficial realization. Such realizations generically exist in
the space of prior beliefs, even if the receiver is a believer.
Corollary 4 Suppose that (A1) and (A2′) hold. If card (Θ) > 2, then A+ ∩ S+ 6= ∅ for a
generic pair of prior beliefs.
We end this section by studying when the optimal experiment would fully reveal the state.
That is, when would a sender not gain from garbling the realizations of a fully informative
experiment? To answer this question, we apply Corollary 2 to the function VS in (11) when
(A1) and (A2′) hold, so that
VS(q
S) = G (ER[θ]) = G
(〈
qS, rRθ
〉
〈qS, rR〉
)
. (22)
Expression (22) suggests that the sender’s gain from a fully informative experiment depends
both on her “risk attitudes” (i.e., on the curvature of G) and the type of receiver she is facing.
The next proposition formalizes this intuition. To present this proposition, recall that pS
dominates pR in the likelihood-ratio sense, pS LR pR, if rSθ = pSθ /pRθ (weakly) increases in θ
— see Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007, pg 42).
provide experiment pi over no experimentation. Conversely, the sender prefers no experimentation over any
experiment that is supported only in the areas A+ ∩ S− and A− ∩ S+.
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Proposition 6 Suppose that (A1) and (A2′) hold.
(i) If G is convex and pS LR pR, then a fully-revealing experiment is optimal.
(ii) If there exist states θ and θ′ such that
(θ′ − θ)
((
rSθ′
)2
G′ (θ′)− (rSθ )2G′ (θ)) < 0, (23)
then a fully revealing experiment is not optimal.
Note that likelihood ratio orders are preserved under Bayesian updating. In particular, if
pS LR pR, then the receiver remains a skeptic after any realization that does not fully reveal
the state, meaning that by fully revealing the state, the sender can increase the receiver’s
average action. As any garbling reduces the variance of the receiver’s posterior beliefs, if uS
is convex and the receiver remains a skeptic after every partially informative realization, then
the sender cannot do better than letting him fully learn the state. Nevertheless, Proposition
6(ii) argues that if at least one of these conditions is relaxed, then the sender would prefer
to garble a fully informative experiment as long as (23) holds. In particular, if G is linear,
then a fully-revealing experiment is optimal if and only if pS LR pR. Therefore, a fully
informative experiment is often suboptimal, even when the sender faces a skeptic.
4.4 Persuading Skeptics and Believers
When experimentation is valuable, what is the optimal experiment? To provide some intu-
ition, we now restrict attention to the case where G in condition (A2′) is concave, so that
according to Proposition 5(ii), experimentation is valuable if and only if A+ ∩ S+ 6= ∅.
An important property of optimal experiments is time-consistent disclosure: there is no
value in further releasing any information after each realization of an optimal experiment.
In our case, this implies that A+ ∩ S+ = ∅ after each realization of an optimal experiment
— ex-post, the sender is never more optimistic about any beneficial belief. This leads to the
following property of optimal experiments.
Proposition 7 Suppose that (A1) and (A2′) hold, and consider a concave G. Let Z∗
be the set of realizations of an optimal experiment, and define λSz = PrS [z] /PrR [z] and
az = ER [θ|z]. Then,
λSz′ ≥ λSz ⇐⇒ az′ ≥ az.
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The proposition states that if one considers the distribution of actions induced by an
optimal experiment, the sender always assigns more probability to higher actions by the
receiver than the receiver does. Actually, the sender’s belief (as given by PrS [az]) dominates
the receiver’s belief (as given by PrR [az]) in the likelihood ratio sense. In a nutshell, regard-
less of whether she is facing a skeptic or a believer, the sender always selects an experiment
about whose beneficial realizations she is always more optimistic. In the online Appendix
B we show how the sender can construct optimal experiments for particular cases, most
notably for the case when G is linear.
4.5 Applications
Attempts to persuade others are pervasive in economics and politics. Politicians and man-
agers try to persuade bureaucrats and workers to exert more effort. Bureaucrats and workers
try to influence the policy and managerial choices of politicians and executives. Interest
groups and firms try to influence governments’ and consumers’ expenditure decisions.
An example of persuasion that has gained increasing attention from governments around
the world is the use of small-scale policy experiments. The information uncovered by these
experiments can influence the actions of legislators, bureaucrats and voters. For example,
“the Perry Preschool Project, the Manhattan Bail Bond Experiment, the Work-Welfare
Experiments, and the National Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) Study have all had
clear, direct impacts on the adoption or continuation of specific policies or (in the case
of JTPA) major funding changes for an ongoing program” (Orr, 1999, pg. 234). It is
important to note that the experiments’ results do not always meet the designer expectations.
According to David Halpern (chief executive of BIT), “one or two in every 10 trials [conducted
by the BIT] fail” (Rutter, 2015). Therefore, the sender might benefit from strategically
designing the experiment to better influence the receiver.23
23A recent example illustrates how the designer might strategically garble the experiment. Some local
police departments in the US conducted experiments to evaluate how body-worn video technology impacts
police-citizen behavior and crime. The test designers wanted legislators to approve a set of proposed rules
for the use of this new technology. The experiment designers chose not to test one important aspect of
the new policy: all police officers in the trial were allowed to watch the recorded video before writing their
reports. Many critics argued that watching the video would greatly influence the reports; therefore, the
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One of the main contributions of our paper is to show how the presence of belief disagree-
ment will fundamentally alter how much information is released. In this section, we apply
our results to show that persuasion should be widespread in all these cases. Throughout this
section, we implicitly assume that there are at least three states.
Application 1 (Motivating Effort): Consider an incumbent politician (or manager) who
wants to persuade a bureaucrat (or worker) to exert more effort. Although politicians usually
hold the power to define policies, bureaucrats’ actions affect the actual implementation and
enforcement of policies — see Bertelli (2012) for an overview of the related literature. More-
over, empirical evidence suggests that there is often open disagreement between politicians
and bureaucrats — see references in Hirsch (forthcoming). 24
For concreteness, suppose that a politician wishes to implement a new policy — e.g., she
wants to change the flat-wage payment of public school teachers to a pay-for-performance
scheme. In order for the policy to be successful, a bureaucrat (e.g., the school district super-
intendent) must exert effort to implement it. State θ > 0 captures the uncertainty regarding
how this new policy will affect voters’ and the bureaucrat’s payoff. Let uR(a, θ) = θa − aρρ
be the payoff of the bureaucrat, where ρ ≥ 2 is a known preference parameter. Let
uS(a, θ) = f(θ)a be the payoff of voters (hence, the payoff of the politician who seeks
reelection), where the function f > 0 captures voters’ preferences. Before implementing
the new policy, the politician can run a policy experiment that will provide information to
influence the bureaucrat’s effort — e.g., design a pilot test in selected schools. Assumptions
(A1) to (A3) hold; therefore, persuasion is generically valuable, independent of the shape
of the politician’s preference f and the alignment of interests between players.
Application 2 (Influencing Policies): In the previous application, the politician (or
manager) had the authority to design and implement the experiment. However, in some
officers should be required to write the report first. While most people agree that watching the video before
writing the report has some influence on the report, we do not know (and might have different priors over)
how big this influence is. To measure the actual impact of this aspect of the policy, the experimenter could
have easily (at no additional monetary cost) randomly assigned some of the officers already participating in
the trial to write the report before watching the video. But the designer strategically chose not to do that.
24For related models of a manager motivating the effort of a worker under heterogeneous prior beliefs, see
Van den Steen (2004, 2009, 2010a, 2011).
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situations, the bureaucrat (or worker) is the one who controls the generation of information
that the politician uses in choosing policies (or that the manager uses to make decisions).
Suppose that the school superintendent (sender) is an independent elected official who
has the authority to run pilot policy tests in the school district. The information uncovered
influences the policy a chosen by the incumbent politician (receiver). The politician max-
imizes the payoff of voters, uR(a, θ) = −(a − θ)2, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, so that a∗ = ER[θ] ∈ [0, 1].
For example, the politician selects the compensation of schoolteachers, where a = 0 repre-
sents a flat wage and a = 1 represents a very steep pay-for-performance scheme. State θ
then represents the optimal policy from the politician’s point of view. The superintendent’s
payoff is uS(a, θ) = −(a − f(θ))2, where function f captures the possible misalignment in
preferences. Assumptions (A1) to (A3) also hold in this case; therefore, persuasion is gener-
ically valuable, independent of the shape of bureaucrat’s preference f and the alignment of
interests between the players.25 In summary, even under extreme conflicts of interest, hard
information still flows in the government — communication does not shut down.
This application is closely related to the “Lobbying” example proposed by KG. In the
example, the authors consider “a setting where a lobbying group commissions a study with
the goal of influencing a benevolent politician. [...] The tobacco lobby has spent large
sums funding studies about the health effects of smoking [...]. Would it make sense for the
lobbyist to commission such studies even if the politician is rational and knows the lobbyist
is providing information with the goal of influencing her decision? Would the optimal study
in this case be biased toward supporting the lobbyist’s position or fully revealing of the true
state?” (KG, pg. 2605)
KG’s conclusion, assuming common priors, is that “the lobbyist either commissions a
fully revealing study or no study at all. This contrasts with the observation that industry-
funded studies often seem to produce results more favorable to the industry than independent
studies. The model suggests that commissioning such biased studies when policymakers are
rational may not be optimal from the industry’s perspective.” (KG, pg. 2606)
Our results might help explain this apparent puzzle. If the lobbyist and the politician
25Note that Application 2 is equivalent to Example 1 in Section 4.1. If there are only two states, then
Example 1 defines the preference misalignment that eliminates the value of persuasion for all prior beliefs.
However, if there are three or more states, then persuasion is generically valuable.
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have heterogeneous priors, then the lobbyist generically benefits from persuasion, the opti-
mal experiment is often partial information disclosure, and the optimal experiment is such
that the sender is more optimistic than the receiver about the expected results.
Application 3 (Seeking Resources): In certain cases, the public signal is better inter-
preted as the sender’s ability to commit to a certain information disclosure rule, such as,
the ability of a government agency (or a private firm) to commit to a certain disclosure rule
about its activities, services and products. This information, in turn, affects the amount of
resources it receives from the government (or the demand from consumers).
For concreteness, consider a government agency or independent institution that produces
a public good g (e.g., an environmental agency in charge of protecting the rain forest). The
bureaucrat who is the head of the institution (sender) wants to maximize the amount of
resources she receives from the government. The incumbent politician (receiver) chooses the
proportional income tax rate a ∈ [0, 1] that is used to finance the institution. The politician is
office-motivated and wants to maximize the payoff of a representative voter. The voter cares
about her consumption of a private good c and the public good g according to cρ+θg, where
ρ ∈ (0, 1) is a known preference parameter and θ is the unknown marginal benefit of the public
good. Let c = (1− a)ym and g = aY , where ym is the pre-tax income of the representative
(median) voter; Y is the total income of the population; and aY is the total tax revenue used
to finance the institution. Hence, the bureaucrat’s payoff is uS(a, θ) = aY . Assuming that
θ > ρy
ρ
m
Y
, it follows that the politician’s optimal choice is a(qR) = 1−
(
ρyρm
ER[θ]Y
) 1
1−ρ
. Because
the receiver’s action depends only on his beliefs through his expectation of θ, without loss
of generality, we can normalize his action so that assumption (A1) holds.
The bureaucrat can commit to disclose information about the marginal value of the public
good (e.g., to a disclosure rule about the information it gathers about the dynamics of the
fauna and flora of the different regions). Since the politician’s action is a strictly increasing,
strictly concave function of her expectation ER[θ], under common priors, it is optimal not
to disclose any information. However, conditions (A1) to (A3) apply, and the bureaucrat
generically benefits from persuasion. That is, persuasion is valuable even if the incumbent
politician strongly believes in the value of protecting the forests and in spite of the fact that
the politician’s financial decision is a strictly concave function of her expectation.
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We can rewrite the model as a firm committing to disclose certain information about the
quality of its products and services to a consumer. Persuasion is then generically valuable,
even when the consumer is overly optimistic about the quality of the firm’s products.
Application 4 (Extreme Conflict): Consider a situation of direct conflict between sender
and receiver — e.g., two politicians competing for the same office or two firms competing for
market share. To highlight the importance of belief disagreement to persuasion, consider the
extreme case uS(a, θ) = −uR(a, θ). If the receiver chooses a, when would the sender benefit
from providing information about θ?
For concreteness, consider an incumbent politician whose political platform is known by
voters, against a challenger who needs to choose a campaign platform (or a known incumbent
firm against a potential entrant who must choose how to enter the market). The challenger
(entrant) wants to choose the action that maximizes his probability of election (or market
share): uR(a, θ) = 1 − (a − θ)2, where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, so that a(qR) = ER[θ] ∈ [0, 1]. From
the challenger’s point of view, his expected payoff from an optimal action decreases in the
variance, ER[uR(a(q
R), θ)] = −VARR[θ]. The incumbent’s objective is to minimize the chal-
lenger’s probability of election, uS(a, θ) = −uR(a, θ). Remarkably, persuasion is generically
valuable even in this extreme case, since assumptions (A1) to (A3) hold. Note that from
the sender’s point of view, her expected payoff can be written as (ES(θ)−ER[θ])2 +VARS[θ].
That is, the sender benefits from the size of the receiver’s “mistake,” captured by the term
(ES(θ)−ER[θ])2, and from the degree of uncertainty, captured by VARS[θ]. Any informative
experiment decreases VARS[θ], which hurts the sender. However, the sender can generically
design an experiment that sufficiently increases the expected mistake, so that persuasion is
valuable. 
5 Private Priors
We can extend the analysis to a case in which the sender is uncertain about the receiver’s prior
beliefs when designing pi. Suppose that prior beliefs are drawn from a distribution H(pR, pS)
with conditional distribution h(pR|pS).26 Proposition 1 still applies for each (pR, pS). Con-
26Note that the receiver’s preferences are unaffected by his beliefs about the sender’s prior. Therefore, the
sender’s choice of experiment conveys no additional information to the receiver. This would not be true if
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sequently, given pS and h(pR|pS), knowledge of the sender’s posterior qS suffices to compute
the joint distribution of posterior beliefs. Moreover, the restriction to language-invariant
equilibria implies that, given (pR, pS), the receiver’s choice depends only on his posterior
belief qR. Therefore, we can compute the sender’s expected payoff VS using the implied
distribution of qR. More specifically, (11) translates to
VS
(
qS
)
= ES[v(q
S, qR)|pS] =
∫
v
qS, qS pRpS〈
qS, p
R
pS
〉
 dh(pR|pS). (24)
With this modification, the expected utility of a sender under an optimal experiment is
V˜S
(
pS
)
, and the sender would benefit from persuasion under the conditions of Corollary
1. Moreover, the expected value to the sender of a perfectly informative experiment is
independent of the receiver’s prior belief. Therefore, the value of garbling is positive whenever
(24) satisfies the conditions in Corollary 2.
As an application of (24), consider the pure persuasion model from Section 4.3. When
the sender knows the receiver’s prior, Proposition 5(i) provides conditions on the likelihood
ratio of priors for persuasion to be valuable. Suppose that these conditions are met, and
the sender strictly benefits from providing experiment pi to a particular receiver. By a
continuity argument, the same pi strictly benefits the sender when she faces another receiver
whose prior belief is not too different. Consequently, even if the sender does not know the
receiver’s prior, persuasion remains beneficial when the receiver’s possible priors are not too
dispersed. Proposition B.1 in Online Appendix B shows that this is, indeed, the case and
provides an upper bound on how dispersed these beliefs can be.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the gain to an individual (sender) from controlling the information
available to a decision maker (receiver) when they openly disagree about their views of the
world. We first characterize the set of distributions over posterior beliefs that can be induced
through an experiment, under our assumption of a “commonly understood experiment” (i.e.,
when players agree on the statistical relation of the experiment to the payoff-relevant state).
the sender privately observed a signal about the state, see Sethi and Yildiz (2012).
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This allows us to compute the gains from persuasion.
In Section 4, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for some belief disagreement
to render experimentation valuable to the sender. We then define a large class of models
in which the sender gains from experimentation for almost every pair of prior beliefs, even
when there is no value of persuasion under a common prior. Our main conditions are:
(i) the receiver’s action depends on his beliefs only through his expectation of some random
variable; and (ii) there are more than two states. The fact that these conditions hold in many
important applications emphasizes our main finding that persuasion should be widespread
in situations of open disagreement.
For a case in which experimentation is not valuable under a common prior, we show
that optimal experiments under heterogeneous priors have an intuitive property: the sender
is relatively more optimistic than the receiver in inducing beneficial outcomes. Indeed, we
show that the sender’s relative optimism is quite strong — her prior belief over realizations
of an optimal experiment dominates the receiver’s prior in the likelihood-ratio sense. This
allows us to clarify why even a sender facing a “believer” can design an experiment about
whose outcomes she is more optimistic.
One important example of persuasion that has gained increasing attention from govern-
ments around the world is the use of small-scale policy experiments. Many policy experi-
ments have had real impacts on policies later adopted (see examples in Section 4.5). There
are many econometric books explaining how to conduct the most informative experiment.
However, many of these experiments are paid for and controlled by a politician or a bu-
reaucrat. Given the preferences and beliefs of the parts involved, the experiment might be
strategically designed (garbled) to influence others. We hope that our results might guide
future empirical investigations that aim to identify which experiments conducted around the
world were, indeed, strategically modified.
To focus on the role of heterogeneous priors on strategic experimentation, we restrict our
analysis in several ways. First, the sender has no private information. Second, we consider
a single receiver. In many situations, however, the sender may want to affect the beliefs of
a collective, where she is typically constrained to use a public signal. Third, we consider
a fixed decision-making process. However, sometimes the sender can both offer a contract
and provide some information to a receiver — i.e., the sender designs a grand mechanism
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specifying the information to be released and several contractible variables. Similarly, one
can examine how the optimal experiment varies across different mechanisms of preference
aggregation (e.g., Alonso and Caˆmara (2015, forthcoming) examine persuasion in a voting
model). We leave all of these promising extensions for future work.
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Necessity : Consider an experiment pi =
(
Z, {pi (·|θ)}θ∈Θ
)
that
induces, from the sender’s perspective, the distribution τ, and let pi(z) = (pi (z|θ))θ∈Θ and
qR(z) and qS(z) be the posterior beliefs of the receiver and the sender if z ∈ Z is realized.
The marginal distribution over the sender’s posterior beliefs satisfies the martingale property
— i.e., Eτ [q
S] = pS. Furthermore, as priors are totally mixed, the receiver assigns positive
probability to z if and only if the sender also assigns positive probability to z.27 Suppose,
then, that pi(z) 6= 0. Bayesian updating implies that after observing z,
qSθ (z) =
pi(z|θ)pSθ
〈pi(z), pS〉 ,
so we can write
qSθ (z)
〈
pi(z), pS
〉 pRθ
pSθ
= pi(z|θ)pRθ ,
and summing over θ ∈ Θ, we obtain〈
pi(z), pS
〉 〈
qS(z), rR
〉
=
〈
pi(z), pR
〉
.
Then, we can relate the two posterior beliefs by
qRθ (z) =
pi(z|θ)pRθ
〈pi(z), pR〉 =
pi(z|θ)pSθ
〈pi(z), pS〉 〈qS(z), rR〉
pRθ
pSθ
= qSθ (z)
rRθ
〈qS(z), rR〉 .
Sufficiency : Given a distribution τ satisfying (i) and (ii), let τS(q
S) be the marginal distribu-
tion of the sender’s posterior beliefs and define the realization space Z =
{
qS : qS ∈ Supp(τS)
}
and the likelihood functions pi(qS|θ) = qSθ PrτS qS
pSθ
. Then, simple calculations reveal that the
experiment pi =
(
Z,
{
pi(qS|θ)}
θ∈Θ
)
induces τ . 
Proof of Proposition 2: Part (i) See KG. Part (ii) As (10) can be seen as a persuasion
model with a common prior, the claim then follows from KG (Corollary 2: pg. 2597).
27Indeed, we have PrR [z] =
〈
pi(z), pR
〉
= 0⇔ pi (z|θ) = 0, θ ∈ Θ⇔ PrS [z] =
〈
pi(z), pS
〉
= 0.
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Proof of Corollary 1: Condition (13) can be rephrased in terms of the subdifferential
∂V (p) of a function V evaluated at p, and simply states that the sender does not benefit
from persuasion if and only if ∂
(−VS(pS)) 6= ∅. Condition (14) then follows immediately
as, if VS is differentiable at p
S, then ∂
(−VS(pS)) can have at most one element.
Sufficiency : As the concave closure V˜S is the lower envelope of all affine functions that ma-
jorize VS and, by assumption, the majorizing affine function f
(
qS
)
= VS
(
pS
)
+
〈
γ, qS − pS〉
satisfies VS
(
pS
)
= f
(
pS
)
, then
VS
(
pS
)
= f
(
pS
) ≥ V˜S (pS) ≥ VS (pS) ,
implying that V˜S
(
pS
)
= VS
(
pS
)
and, by Proposition 2, there is no value of persuasion.
Necessity : Suppose that there is no value of persuasion. From Proposition 2 this implies
that V˜S
(
pS
)
= VS
(
pS
)
. As V˜S is the concave closure of an upper-semicontinuous function
in a compact set, the differential of −V˜S
(
qS
)
is non-empty for all qS ∈ int(∆ (Θ)). Any
element of ∂
(
−V˜S(pS)
)
would then satisfy (13). 
Proof of Corollary 2: Sufficiency : Suppose that (15) is satisfied. Then, any pi that induces
the distribution over posterior beliefs σ must satisfy Eσ
[
qS
]
= pS, implying that
∑
θ∈Θ
pSθ uS(a(1θ), θ) = Eσ
[∑
θ∈Θ
qSθ uS(a(1θ), θ)
]
≥ Eσ
[
VS
(
qS
)]
.
Thus, a fully informative experiment weakly dominates any pi and is, thus, optimal.
Necessity : Fix any belief qS ∈ ∆ (Θ) and let δ¯ be defined as
δ¯ = max
{
δ : pSθ −
δ
1− δ (q
S
θ − pSθ ) ≥ 0, δ ∈ [0, 1]
}
.
As the prior belief pS ∈ int(∆ (Θ)) we have 1 > δ¯ > 0. Letting 1θ be the belief that assigns
probability 1 to state θ, consider, now, an experiment that induces belief qS with probability
δ¯ and belief 1θ with probability (1− δ¯)
(
pSθ − δ¯1−δ¯ (qSθ − pSθ )
)
= pSθ − δqSθ ≥ 0 for each θ ∈ Θ.
The expected utility of the sender under this experiment is
δVS
(
qS
)
+
∑
θ∈Θ
(
pSθ − δqSθ
)
uS(a(1θ), θ) = δ
(
VS
(
qS
)−∑
θ∈Θ
qSθ uS(a(1θ), θ)
)
+
∑
θ∈Θ
pSθ uS(a(1θ), θ).
Full disclosure is optimal by assumption; therefore, we must have
δ
(
VS
(
qS
)−∑
θ∈Θ
qSθ uS(a(1θ), θ)
)
+
∑
θ∈Θ
pSθ uS(a(1θ), θ) ≤
∑
θ∈Θ
pSθ uS(a(1θ), θ),
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from which, given that δ¯ > 0, we must then necessarily have (15). 
Proof of Proposition 3: Necessity : We prove the contrapositive: if for some θ′, qRθ′uS
(
a(qR), θ′
)
is not concave, then there exists a pair of mixed prior beliefs pR and pS such that the
sender benefits from persuasion. Let n = card (Θ) , and suppose that for θ′, the function
qRθ′uS
(
a(qR), θ′
)
is not concave. Then, there exist q+, q− ∈ int (∆ (Θ)) , and ν, 0 < ν < 1,
such that
νq+θ′uS
(
a(q+), θ′
)
+ (1− ν)q−θ′uS
(
a(q−), θ′
)− pRθ′uS (a(pR), θ′) = Ψ > 0,
where pR ∈ int (∆ (Θ)) is given by pR = νq+ + (1− ν)q−. Since uS
(
a(qR), θ
)
is bounded, let
Ψ¯ = min
θ∈Θ
(
νq+θ uS (a(q
+), θ) + (1− ν)q−θ uS (a(q−), θ′)− pθuS (a(p), θ′)
pRθ
)
.
Define the belief pS such that pSθ = ψ if θ 6= θ′ and pSθ′ = 1− (n− 1)ψ, where ψ is defined by
ψ = min
(
1
n (n− 1) (Ψ + pRθ′ ∣∣Ψ¯∣∣) , 1n
)
> 0.
Consider an experiment pˆi with Z = {q+, q−}, which induces posterior beliefs q+ and q− in
a receiver with prior pR. The value of experiment pˆi to a sender with prior pS, is
Vpˆi − v(pS, pR) = νVR
(
q+
)
+ (1− ν)VR
(
q+
)− VR (pR) =
=
∑
θ∈Θ
pSθ
pRθ
(
νq+θ uS
(
a(q+), θ
)
+ (1− ν)q−θ uS
(
a(q−), θ′
)− pθuS (a(p), θ′))
≥ 1− (n− 1)ψ
pRθ′
Ψ− (n− 1)ψ ∣∣Ψ¯∣∣ ≥ 1− 1n
pRθ′
> 0.
Therefore, a sender with prior pS benefits from persuading a receiver with prior pR.
Sufficiency : Suppose that qRθ uS
(
a(qR), θ
)
is everywhere concave in qR for every θ ∈ Θ.
Then, for any pair of totally mixed priors, VR
(
qR
)
=
∑
θ∈Θ
pSθ
pRθ
qRθ uS
(
a(qR), θ
)
is concave as
a positive linear combination of concave functions. Thus, V˜R
(
qR
)
= VR
(
qR
)
for all qR and
Proposition 2 implies that the value of persuasion is zero. 
The following two lemmas are used in the proof of our next propositions.
Lemma A.1 Let x, y ∈ RN , and W defined by (3). Then,
1
2
(∥∥x‖W ∥∥∥∥y‖W ∥∥+ 〈x‖W , y‖W 〉) = max 〈x, v〉 〈y, v〉 , s.t., v ∈ W, ‖v‖ = 1. (25)
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Proof of Lemma A.1: Let ρ(x, y) be the angle formed by the vectors x and y. If v ∈ W ,
then 〈v, x〉 = 〈v, x‖W 〉 and 〈v, y〉 = 〈v, y‖W 〉 . Therefore, for every v ∈ W, ‖v‖ = 1, we have
〈x, v〉 〈y, v〉 = 〈v, x‖W 〉 〈v, y‖W 〉 = ∥∥x‖W ∥∥∥∥y‖W ∥∥ ‖v‖2 cos ρ (v, x‖W ) cos ρ (v, y‖W )
=
∥∥x‖W ∥∥∥∥y‖W ∥∥ cos (ρ (v, x‖W )+ ρ (v, y‖W ))+ cos (ρ (v, x‖W )− ρ (v, y‖W ))
2
=
∥∥x‖W ∥∥∥∥y‖W ∥∥ cos (2ρ (v, x‖W )+ ρ (x‖W , y‖W ))+ cos (ρ (x‖W , y‖W ))
2
,
which implies that
max
v∈W,‖v‖=1
〈x, v〉 〈y, v〉
=
∥∥x‖W ∥∥∥∥y‖W ∥∥[cos (ρ (x‖W , y‖W ))
2
+ max
v∈W,‖v‖=1
cos
(
2ρ
(
v, x‖W
)
+ ρ
(
x‖W , y‖W
))
2
]
=
∥∥x‖W ∥∥∥∥y‖W ∥∥[cos (ρ (x‖W , y‖W ))
2
+
1
2
]
,
where the maximum is achieved by selecting a vector v such that ρ
(
v, x‖W
)
= −1
2
ρ
(
x‖W , y‖W
)
.
Rewriting this last expression, one obtains (25). 
Lemma A.2 Suppose that N = card(Θ) ≥ 3, and consider the subspace W = {w ∈ RN : 〈w, 1〉 = 0}
with the derived topology. Then, for x /∈ W, the rational function 〈w, x〉 / 〈w, y〉, w ∈ W , is
bounded in a neighborhood of 0 if and only if x‖W and y‖W are collinear.
Proof of Lemma A.2: Consider the linear subspaceWx,1 =
{
w ∈ RN : 〈w, x〉 = 0, 〈w, 1〉 = 0} .
As, by assumption, x /∈ W , then Wx,1 is a linear subspace of dimension N − 2 ≥ 1. Con-
sider, now, the subspace Wy =
{
w ∈ RN : 〈w, y〉 = 0}. The ratio 〈w, x〉 / 〈w, y〉 is locally
unbounded in W iff Wx,1 ∩ W cy 6= ∅. First, if the projections x‖W and y‖W are not
collinear, then the orthogonal projection y‖Wx,1 is non-zero, implying that
〈
y‖Wx,1 , x
〉
= 0
but
〈
y‖Wv,1 , y
〉
> 0. This establishes that Wx,1 ∩W cy 6= ∅. Now suppose that x‖W = λ y‖W
for some λ 6= 0. Then, 〈w, x‖W 〉 = 0 iff 〈w, y‖W 〉 = 0, implying Wx,1 ∩W cy = ∅. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Define the vectors uS (a) = (uS (a, θ))θ∈Θ and ∂uS (a) =
(
∂uS(a,θ)
∂a
)
θ∈Θ
,
so that at the prior belief, we have u′S = ∂uS
(〈
pR, θ
〉)
The representation (17) can be con-
cisely written as VR
(
qR
)
=
〈
qR, rSuS
(〈
qR, θ
〉)〉
, and has gradient at pR
∇VR(pR) =
〈
pR, rSu′S
〉
θ + rSuS
(〈
pR, θ
〉)
.
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Corollary 1 implies that the value of persuasion is zero if and only if
〈∇VR(pR), qR − pR〉 ≥ V R(qR)− V R(pR), qR ∈ ∆ (Θ) ,
which, in our case, leads to
〈
pR, rSu′S
〉 〈
θ, qR − pR〉− 〈qR, rS (uS (〈qR, θ〉)− uS (〈pR, θ〉))〉 ≥ 0, qR ∈ ∆ (Θ) . (26)
To ease notation, let ε = qR − pR ∈ W and define 4 as the left-hand side of (26)
4 = 〈pR, rSu′S〉 〈θ, ε〉 − 〈qR, rS (uS (〈qR, θ〉)− uS (〈pR, θ〉))〉 . (27)
We now show that if rSu′S‖W 6= 0 and if θ and rSu′S are not negatively collinear with respect
to W , we can find a feasible qR such that 4 < 0. First, with the help of the identities
rS
(
uS
(〈
qR, θ
〉)− uS (〈pR, θ〉)) = (∫ 〈qR,θ〉
〈pR,θ〉
rSθ
∂uS(t, θ)
∂a
dt
)
θ∈Θ
and
〈
pR, rS
(
uS
(〈
qR, θ
〉)− uS (〈pR, θ〉))〉− 〈θ, ε〉 〈pR, rSu′S〉
=
∫ 〈qR,θ〉
〈pR,θ〉
〈
pR, rS∂uS (t)
〉
dt−
∫ 〈qR,θ〉
〈pR,θ〉
〈
pR, rSu′S
〉
dt
=
∫ 〈qR,θ〉
〈pR,θ〉
〈
pR, rS
(
∂uS(t, θ)
∂a
− ∂uS(
〈
pR, θ
〉
, θ)
∂a
)〉
dt
=
∫ 〈qR,θ〉
〈pR,θ〉
∫ t
〈pR,θ〉
〈
pR, rS
∂2uS(τ, θ)
∂2a
〉
dτdt,
we can rewrite 4 in (27) as
4 = −
∫ 〈qR,θ〉
〈pR,θ〉
∫ t
〈pR,θ〉
〈
pR, rS
∂2uS(τ, θ)
∂2a
〉
dτdt−
∫ 〈qR,θ〉
〈pR,θ〉
〈
ε, rS∂uS (t)
〉
dt. (28)
The smoothness condition (A2) implies that ∂uS(a,θ)
∂a
and ∂
2uS(a,θ)
∂2a
are bounded in the
compact set A =
{
a : a =
〈
qR, z
〉
, qR ∈ ∆ (Θ)}. Let MS = maxa∈A,θ∈Θ ∣∣∣∂2uS(a,θ)∂2a ∣∣∣, which, for
some φ ∈ [〈pR, θ〉 , 〈qR, θ〉] , allow us to write the following second-order expansion∫ 〈qR,θ〉
〈pR,θ〉
〈
ε, rS∂uS (t)
〉
dt =
〈
ε, rSu′S
〉 〈ε, θ〉+ 1
2
〈
ε, rS
∂2uS(φ, θ)
∂2a
〉
(〈ε, θ〉)2
≥ 〈ε, rSu′S〉 〈ε, θ〉 − 12MS 〈|ε| , rS〉 (〈ε, θ〉)2 .
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Then,
4 ≤ MS
∫ 〈qR,θ〉
〈pR,θ〉
∫ t
〈pR,θ〉
dτdt− 〈ε, rSu′S〉 〈ε, θ〉+ 12MS 〈|ε| , rS〉 (〈ε, θ〉)2
=
1
2
〈ε, θ〉2 (1 + 〈|ε| , rS〉)MS − 〈ε, rSu′S〉 〈ε, θ〉
= 〈ε, θ〉2
(
1 +
〈|ε| , rS〉
2
MS −
〈
ε, rSu′S
〉
〈ε, θ〉
)
.
From Lemma A.1, if rSu′S||W 6= 0, and θ and rSu′S are not negatively collinear wrt W , then
there exists a neighborhood N(0) of 0 in W such that
〈
ε, rSu′S
〉
/ 〈ε, θ〉 admits no upper
bound. This establishes the existence of ε ∈ N(0), and, thus, a feasible qR = pR+ε, such that
1 +
〈|ε| , rS〉
2
MS −
〈
ε, rSu′S
〉
〈ε, θ〉 < 0,
implying that 4 < 0. 
Proof of Corollary 3: Fix a mixed prior pR, and define the sets
O =
{
p ∈ int (∆ (Θ)) : pθ
u′S,θ
pRθ
= k, k ∈ R, θ ∈ Θ
}
, and
P =
{
p ∈ int (∆ (Θ)) :
(
pθ
u′S,θ
pRθ
− pθ′
u′S,θ′
pRθ′
)
= −λ1 (θ − θ′) , λ1 > 0, θ, θ′ ∈ Θ
}
.
The sets O and P capture the conditions in Proposition 4 since (i)
(
rS · u′S
)
||W = 0 iff p
S ∈ O,
and (ii) rS · u′S and θ are negatively collinear with respect to W iff pS ∈ P . We first show
that each set is contained in a one-dimensional subspace of W
We start by studying the set O. If u′S,θ = 0 for all θ, then O = ∆ (Θ). However, this
condition would violate assumption (A3). If u′S,θ 6= 0 and u′S,θ′ = 0 for some θ′ 6= θ, then
the set O = ∅ as O does not contain a mixed prior. Finally, if u′S,θ 6= 0 for all θ, then O is
contained in the one-dimensional subspace
{
p ∈ Rcard(Θ) : pθ = k p
R
θ
u′S,θ
, k ∈ R
}
.
Now consider the set P. If u′S,θ = u
′
S,θ′ = 0 for two distinct states θ 6= θ′, then P = ∅.
Suppose, now, that u′S,θ 6= 0 for all θ. Then, P is contained in the one-dimensional subspace{
p ∈ Rcard(Θ) : pθ =
(
λ0
1
u′S,θ
− λ1 θ
u′S,θ
)
pRθ ,
∑(
λ0
1
u′S,θ
− λ1 θ
u′S,θ
)
pRθ = 1, λ0,λ1 ∈ R
}
.
Overall, for every sender’s prior, the set in which the conditions in Proposition 4 are
violated, given by the union of O and P , is contained in the union of two one-dimensional
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subspaces. If card (Θ) > 2, then dim(∆ (Θ)) > 1, and this set is a non-generic set of ∆ (Θ).
Since this is true for every mixed prior pR ∈ int (∆ (Θ)), the conditions in Proposition 4 are
violated in a non-generic set of pairs of mixed prior beliefs. 
Proof of Lemma 1: Let ε = qR − pR ∈ W with qR ∈ ∆ (Θ). Posterior belief qR ∈ A+ if
and only if 〈ε, θ〉 ≥ 0, while (7) implies qR ∈ S+ if and only if 〈ε, rS〉 > 0. We now show
that A+ ∩ S+ = ∅ iff pR = pS or rS and θ are negatively collinear with respect to W.
First, if pR = pS, then rSθ = 1 and
〈
ε, rS
〉
=
〈
qR − pR, 1〉 = 0, so S+ = ∅. Second,
suppose that pR 6= pS. Then, since −ε ∈ W if ε ∈ W,then A+ ∩ S+ = ∅ iff
〈ε, θ〉 〈ε, rS〉 ≤ 0 , ε = qR − pR, qR ∈ ∆ (Θ) .
Since the set
{
ε : ε = qR − pR, qR ∈ ∆ (Θ)} ⊂ W contains a neighborhood of 0 in W , then
the previous condition is satisfied if and only if the following global condition is true:
〈ε, θ〉 〈ε, rS〉 ≤ 0 for ε ∈ W,
or, in other words, iff the quadratic form 〈ε, θ〉 〈ε, rS〉 is negative semidefinite in W .
Consider the orthogonal decompositions θ = θ‖W +αθ1 and rS = rS‖W +αr1. Whenever ε ∈
W, we have 〈ε, θ〉 = 〈ε, θ‖W 〉 and 〈ε, rS〉 = 〈ε, rS‖W 〉 , implying that negative semidefiniteness
of 〈ε, θ〉 〈ε, rS〉 in W is equivalent to negative semidefiniteness of 〈ε, θ‖W 〉 〈ε, rS‖W 〉 in W.
From Lemma A.1, we have
0 = max
ε∈W,‖ε‖=1
〈
ε, θ‖W
〉 〈
ε, rS‖W
〉⇔ 〈θ‖W , rS‖W 〉 = −||θ‖W ||||rS‖W ||,
Since θ‖W 6= 0 and rS‖W 6= 0, then
〈
θ‖W , rS‖W
〉
= −||θ‖W ||||rS‖W || iff cos
(
θ‖W , rS‖W
)
= −1,
which is equivalent to the existence of α > 0 such that θ‖W = −αrS‖W .
Proof of Proposition 5: The representation (16) in our setup gives VR(q
R) = G(
〈
qR, θ
〉
)
〈
qR, rS
〉
.
Let 4 be defined in (27), which translates in our case to
4 = G′(〈pR, θ〉) 〈θ, ε〉 − 〈qR, rS〉 (G(〈qR, θ〉)−G(〈pR, θ〉)) . (29)
The proof of Proposition 4 shows that the value of persuasion is zero if and only if 4 ≥ 0.
Part (i)- Follows from applying Proposition 4 to (A1) and (A2’).
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Part (ii)- We show that if G is concave, then the condition on θ and rS is also necessary
for the sender to benefit from persuasion. We prove the contrapositive: if θ and rS are
negatively collinear wrt W, then the value of persuasion is zero.
Concavity of G yields the following bound
G(
〈
qR, θ
〉
)−G(〈pR, θ〉) ≤ G′(〈pR, θ〉) 〈ε, θ〉 ,
which, applied to (29) and noting that 1− 〈qR, rS〉 = 〈ε, rS〉, implies that
4 ≥ −G′(〈pR, θ〉) 〈ε, θ〉 〈ε, rS〉 . (30)
As θ and rS are negatively collinear wrt W , Lemma 1 implies that
〈ε, θ〉 〈ε, rS〉 ≤ 0 for ε ∈ W,
which applied to (30) leads to
4 ≥ −u′S(
〈
pR, θ
〉
) 〈ε, θ〉 〈ε, rS〉 ≥ 0 for ε ∈ W, .
As 4 ≥ 0 for all beliefs, Corollary 1 establishes that the value of persuasion is zero. 
Proof of Corollary 4: Assumption (A2’) implies that ∂uS(a,θ)
∂a
= G′(a) > 0, so that
Assumption (A3) is satisfied. The claim then follows from applying Corollary 3 to this
particular case. 
Proof of Proposition 6: Part (i) - First, likelihood ratio orders are preserved by Bayesian
updating with commonly understood experiments (Whitt, 1979; Milgrom, 1981). Thus,
induced posteriors satisfy qS(z) LR qR(z) if pS LR pR for any pi and realization z, so we
must then have
〈
qS(z), θ
〉 ≥ 〈qR(z), θ〉 . Therefore,
qSθG(〈1θ, θ〉) ≥ G(
〈
qS, θ
〉
) ≥ G(〈qR, θ〉) = VS (qS) , qS ∈ ∆ (Θ) ,
where the first inequality follows from convexity of G. Corollary 2 then implies that a
fully-revealing experiment is optimal.
Part (ii) - Consider two states θ and θ′ and the indexed family of receiver and sender’s
posterior beliefs qR(δ) and qS(δ) given by
qR(δ) = δ1θ′ + (1− δ)1θ, δ ∈ [0, 1],
qS(δ) = λ(δ)1θ′ + (1− λ(δ))1θ,with λ(δ) = δrSθ′/(δrSθ′ + (1− δ)rSθ ).
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Define W (δ, θ, θ′) as
W (δ, θ, θ′) = λ(δ)G(θ′) + (1− λ(δ))G(θ′)−G(δθ′ + (1− δ)θ′).
From Corollary 2, if for some (δ, θ, θ′), we have W (δ, θ, θ′) < 0, then the value of garbling is
positive. After some algebraic manipulations, we can express W (δ, θ, θ′) as
W (δ, θ, θ′) =
δ(1− δ)
(δrSθ′ + (1− δ)rSθ )
S(δ, θ, θ′),
with
S(δ, θ, θ′) = rSθ′
1
(1− δ)
∫ θ′
δθ′+(1−δ)θ
G′ (t) dt− rSθ
1
δ
∫ δθ′+(1−δ)θ
θ
G′ (t) dt.
Evaluating S(δ, θ, θ′) at the extremes, we obtain
S(0, θ, θ′) = (θ′ − θ) (rSθ′G¯′ − rSθG′ (θ)) , (31)
S(1, θ, θ′) = (θ′ − θ) (rSθ′G′ (θ′)− rSθ G¯′) , (32)
with
G¯′ =
1
(θ′ − θ)
∫ θ′
θ
G′ (t) dt.
By assumption, there exist θ′ and θ, θ′ > θ, such that
(
rSθ′
)2
G′ (θ′) <
(
rSθ
)2
G′ (θ). This
implies that
rS
θ′
rSθ
G′ (θ′) < r
S
θ
rS
θ′
G′ (θ), which means that either S(0, θ, θ′) or S(1, θ, θ′) is strictly
negative. To see this, suppose, for example, that S(0, θ, θ′) ≥ 0. Then,
rSθ′
rSθ
G′ (θ′)− G¯′ < r
S
θ
rSθ′
G′ (θ)− G¯′ = − S(0, θ, θ
′)
(θ′ − θ) rSθ′
≤ 0⇒ S(1, θ, θ′) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 7: Consider a pair of realizations z and z′ of an optimal experiment
pi. Consider a new experiment pˆi, which is identical to pi except that realizations z and z′ are
merged into a single realization. The difference in the sender’s expected utility from these
two experiments is
Vpˆi − Vpi = (PrS[z] + PrS[z′])G
(
PrR[z]
PrR[z] + PrR[z′]
az +
PrR[z]
PrR[z] + PrR[z′]
az′
)
− (PrS[z]G(az) + PrS[z′]G(az′))
≥ (PrS[z] + PrS[z′]) PrR[z]
PrR[z] + PrR[z′]
G (az) +
PrR[z]
PrR[z] + PrR[z′]
G (az′)
− (PrS[z]G(az) + PrS[z′]G(az′))
=
PrR[z] PrR[z
′]
PrR[z] + PrR[z′]
(
λSz′ − λSz
)
(G(az)−G(az′)) .
Optimality of pi requires that 0 ≥ Vpˆi − Vpi so that 0 ≥
(
λSz′ − λSz
)
(G(az)−G(az′)). Since G
is increasing, if λSz′ > λ
S
z , then we must have az′ ≥ az. 
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B Online Appendix
In this Online Appendix we provide formal statements and proofs of the claims made in Sec-
tion 4.4 and 5 of “Bayesian Persuasion with Heterogeneous Priors,”by Alonso and Caˆmara.
B.1 Optimal Experiments to Persuade Skeptics and Believers
We complete Section 4.4 by characterizing properties of optimal experiments and describe
a procedure to derive an optimal experiment. To describe this procedure, we now restrict
attention to the case in which the sender is risk-neutral over the receiver’s beliefs.
Proposition 8 Suppose that (A1) and (A2′) hold, with G linear, card (Θ) > 2, and that
for each triplet θi, θj, θk ∈ Θ of states, (θi, θj, θk) and (rSi , rSj , rSk ) are not negatively collinear
with respect to W. For each pair of states (θi, θj), define
∆(i,j) = −
(
rSj − rSi
)
(θj − θi) . (33)
If pi∗ is an optimal experiment, then, after each realization of pi∗, the receiver puts positive
probability in at most two states. Furthermore, for each state θi, there is a threshold ξi ≥ 0
such that there is a realization of pi∗ induced by both states θi and θj if and only if ∆(i,j) ≥ ξi.
Consequently, for every subset of states {θi, θj, θk}, if either ∆(i,j) ≤ min{∆(i,k),∆(k,j)}
or ∆(i,j) < 0, then there is no realization supported on both θi and θj.
Consider any pair θj > θi. The term ∆(i,j) captures the value to the sender of “bundling”
states θi and θj — the value of pooling these states into the same realization of the experi-
ment. Pooling the states has positive value if and only if the receiver is a believer (rSj < r
S
i ),
conditional on the partition {θi, θj}. A positive-value bundle becomes more valuable when
the differences rSi − rSj and θj − θi are larger. If state θi has more than one positive-value
bundle, then the sender optimally allocates probability mass from θi across these bundles
according to their value. Bundles with low positive value may be broken so that more
probability mass can be assigned to higher-value bundles.
We now apply Proposition 8 to construct an algorithm to solve for the optimal experi-
ment when there are three states, θ1 < θ2 < θ3 (see the proof of Proposition 8 for details):
Step 1: Compute the ratios
rS2−rS1
θ2−θ1 and
rS3−rS2
θ3−θ2 . If the ratios are equal to each other and
1
(weakly) negative, then no experimentation is optimal. Otherwise, proceed to Step 2.
Step 2: Compute the pooling values ∆(1,2), ∆(2,3) and ∆(3,1). If all values are (weakly)
negative, then a fully informative experiment is optimal. Otherwise, proceed to Step 3.
Step 3: Let θi and θj be the states with the lowest pooling value ∆(i,j), and θk the remaining
state. Construct experiment piα as follows. There is a binary realization space Z = {zi, zj}.
Likelihood functions are: state θi induces realization zi with probability one; state θj induces
zj with probability one; state θk induces realization zi with probability α and induces zj with
probability 1−α. The optimal experiment piα∗ is the one with α∗ that maximizes the sender’s
expected payoff
max
α∈[0,1]
PrS[zi|piα]ER[θ|zi, piα] + PrS[zj|piα]ER[θ|zj, piα]. (34)
We can use this algorithm to solve the example from the introduction: Θ = {1, 1.5, 2},
pS = (0.85, 0.10, 0.05) and pR = (0.10, 0.40, 0.55). The condition in Step 1 is not met, so we
proceed to Step 2 and compute ∆1,1.5 = 4.125, ∆1.5,2 = 0.075 and ∆1,2 = 8.4. Since they are
positive, we proceed to Step 3. The lowest pooling value is ∆1.5,2; hence, we construct the
binary realization space Z = {z1.5, z2}. State {1.5} induces z1.5 with probability one; state
{2} induces z2 with probability one; and state {1} induces z1.5 with probability α. Given
this experiment, (34) becomes
max
α∈[0,1]
(α0.85 + 0.1)
(
1
α0.85
0.1 + α0.85
+ 1.5
0.1
0.1 + α0.85
)
+ ((1− α)0.85 + 0.05)
(
1
(1− α)0.85
(1− α)0.85 + 0.05 + 2
0.05
(1− α)0.85 + 0.05
)
,
and the sender’s optimal choice is α∗ = 1.
In summary, the sender’s primary concern is which bundles should be broken and which
should be kept. When there are more than three states, the logic above can be used to
eliminate all bundles with negative value and, for each triplet of states, eliminate the bundle
with the lowest value. After all the “weak” bundles are eliminated, each group of states
no longer “connected” with other groups of states can then be treated independently in the
design of an optimal experiment.
Proof of Proposition 8: Proposition 5.i shows that the condition on each triplet θi, θj, θk ∈
Θ implies that any realization of an optimal experiment leads to posterior beliefs supported
2
on at most two states. For each pair (θi, θj), we now investigate under what conditions the
optimal experiment has a realization induced by states θi and θj.
Denote by zij a realization induced by both states θi and θj. In particular, we allow
zii to be a realization induced only by θi (and, thus, that fully reveals the state). For any
experiment pi, we have that the sender’s expectation over its posterior expectations must
equal the prior expectation — i.e., EpiS [ES [θ|z]] = ES [θ]. Therefore, if an experiment pi∗
maximizes the sender’s expectation of the receiver’s posterior expectation, it also maximizes
the sender’s expectation of the difference between the receiver’s and the sender’s expectation.
That is, for an arbitrary pi,
Epi
∗
S [ER [θ|z]] ≥ EpiS [ER [θ|z]]⇔ Epi
∗
S [ER [θ|z]− ES [θ|z]] ≥ EpiS [ER [θ|z]− ES [θ|z]] .
If a sender seeks to maximize the difference between the receiver’s and her expectation of
the state, her expected utility from an experiment pi can be written as
EpiS [ER [θ|z]− ES [θ|z]] =
∑
PrS[z]
(〈
qR(z), θ
〉−〈 qR(z)rS〈qR(z), rS〉 , θ
〉)
=
∑
PrR[z]
(〈
qR(z), θ
〉 〈
qR(z), rS
〉− 〈qR(z)rS, θ〉) .
If an experiment induces realizations zij that are only supported on at most two states, then〈
qR(zij), θ
〉 〈
qR(zij), r
S
〉− 〈qR(zij)rS, θ〉 = −qRi (zij)qRj (zij) (rSj − rSi ) (θj − θi)
= qRi (zij)q
R
j (zij)∆(i,j),
so that we can write
EpiS [ER [θ|z]− ES [θ|z]] =
∑
PrR [zij] q
R
i (zij)q
R
j (zij)∆(i,j). (35)
Letting αiij = Pr [zij|θi] PrS [θi] , and denoting by H(p, q) the harmonic mean of p and q, so
that H(p, q) = 2pq
p+q
, we can write (35) as
EpiS [ER [θ|z]− ES [θ|z]] =
1
2
∑
H(αiij, α
j
ij)∆(i,j). (36)
As previously noted, an experiment that maximizes (35) also maximizes EpiS [ER [θ|z]] . There-
fore, an optimal experiment under (A1) and (A2′) also solves the following program:
max
∑
H(αiij, α
j
ij)∆(i,j), s.t.α
i
ij, α
j
ij ≥ 0,
∑
θk∈Θ
αiik = p
R
θi
. (37)
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Consider a fixed state θi. We now investigate which realizations will be induced by θi. First,
if αiij, α
j
ij > 0, we must have ∆(i,j) > 0, as the sender could otherwise improve by having the
experiment fully reveal θi and θj if zij is realized. Second, as
∂H(αiij, α
j
ij)
∂αiij
=
(
αjij
αiij + α
j
ij
)2
≤ 1,
the marginal return to increasing αiij in H(α
i
ij, α
j
ij) is largest when α
i
ij = 0, in which case it
equals 1. Now suppose that under an optimal experiment, we have that αiij > 0 and α
i
ik = 0.
Then, we must have that ∆(i,j) ≥ ∆(i,k). Otherwise, if ∆(i,j) < ∆(i,k), marginally increasing
αiik while reducing α
i
ij would generate a gain to the sender
∂H(αiij, α
k
ik)
∂αiik
∆(i,k) −
∂H(αiij, α
j
ij)
∂αiij
∆(i,j) = ∆(i,k) −
∂H(αiij, α
j
ij)
∂αiij
∆(i,j) > ∆(i,k) −∆(i,j) ≥ 0.
To prove the last claim, suppose by way of contradiction that ∆(i,j) ≤ min{∆(i,k),∆(k,j)}
and yet PrS [zi,j] > 0. First, this requires ∆(i,j) ≥ 0. Second, applying the first part of
Proposition 8 implies that ∆(i,j) ≥ ξi, and since ∆(i,k) ≥ ∆(i,j), we must have PrS [zi,k] > 0.
Similarly, ∆(k,j) ≥ ∆(i,j) ≥ ξj implies that PrS [zk,j] > 0. Finally, the fact that all elements
∆(i,j),∆(i,k),and ∆(k,j) are positive implies that r
S decreases for a higher state — i.e., for
θj > θi, we must have r
S
j < r
S
i .
Suppose, wlog, that the three states are ordered θi < θj < θk. Since (7) can be rewritten
as λSz =
〈
qR(z), rS
〉
, PrS [zi,j] ,PrS [zj,k] > 0 implies r
S
i > λ
S
zij
> rSj > λ
S
zjk
> rSk . Therefore,
azij < azjk , but λ
S
zij
> λSzjk , which violates the conclusion of Proposition 7, and, thus, this
experiment cannot be optimal. 
B.2 Private Priors
Consider the extended model with private priors described in Section 5. As an application
of (24), consider the pure persuasion model from Section 4.3. When the sender knows the
receiver’s prior, Proposition 5(i) provides conditions on the likelihood ratio of priors such
that persuasion is valuable. Suppose that these conditions are met and the sender strictly
benefits from providing experiment pi to a particular receiver. By a continuity argument,
the same pi strictly benefits the sender when she faces another receiver whose beliefs are not
too different. Consequently, even if the sender does not know the receiver’s prior, persuasion
4
remains beneficial when the receiver’s possible priors are not too dispersed. Proposition B.1
provides an upper bound on how dispersed these beliefs can be. To this end, let R be the
set of likelihood ratios induced by the priors in the support of h(pR|pS),
R =
{
rR : {rRθ = pRθ /pSθ }θ∈Θ, pR ∈ Supp(h(pR|pS))
}
. (38)
Proposition B.1 Suppose that rR and rRθ are not collinear w.r.t. W for all rR ∈ R, and
let m = 1
2
max|u′′S(a)|
minu′S(a)
> 0. If for all rR, rR
′ ∈ R∥∥∥rR − rR′∥∥∥ ≤ β, (39)
with β given by (47), then the sender benefits from persuasion.
The condition on rR and rRθ implies that if the sender knew the receiver’s prior, then she
could find an experiment with a positive value (cf. Proposition 5). The bound β is defined
below by (47), as a function of the curvature of uS. From (39), β represents a lower bound
on the cosine of the angle between any two likelihood ratios in the support of h(pR|pS).
Therefore, (39) describes how different the receiver’s possible prior beliefs can be for the
sender still to benefit from persuasion, by imposing an upper bound on the angle between
any two likelihood ratios in R.
Proof : The proof of this Proposition will make use of the following lemma:
Lemma B.1 Let R be defined by (38) and m = 1
2
max|u′′S(a)|
minu′S(a)
> 0, and for each rR ∈ R, define
∆S =
〈qS ,rRθ〉
〈qS ,rR〉 −
〈
pR, θ
〉
, and define lrR(ε) as
lrR(ε) =
〈
ε, rR
〉
∆S
. (40)
For any ε and rR ∈ R such that
lrR(ε) < −m and ∆S > 0, with pS + ε ∈ ∆ (Θ) , (41)
there exists an experiment pi with the following properties: (i) Some realization of pi induces
in the sender the belief pS + ε; and (ii) pi increases the expected utility of the sender when
the receiver’s associated likelihood ratio is rR.
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Proof : The function lrR(ε) has an immediate interpretation as a measure of disagreement:
the numerator
〈
ε, rR
〉
is the difference in the probability that the receiver and sender attach
to a realization inducing a posterior qS = pS+ε on the sender, divided by the probability that
the sender ascribes to such realization, while the denominator is the change in the receiver’s
action when the sender changes her belief to qS. We first show that if some ε satisfies (41),
then the value of information control is positive. Consider VS defined in (11), which in this
case can be written as
VS(q
S) = uS
(〈
qS, rRθ
〉
〈qS, rR〉
)
,
with gradient at pS
∇VS(pS) = u′S(
〈
pR, θ
〉
)
(
rRθ − 〈pR, θ〉 rR) .
By Corollary 1, the value of information control is positive if and only if there exists ε, with
pS + ε ∈ ∆ (Θ) , such that 〈∇VS(pS), ε〉 < VS(pS + ε)− VS(pS). (42)
We now show that an ε satisfying (41) also satisfies (42). Since
uS
(〈
qS, rRθ
〉
〈qS, rR〉
)
−uS(
〈
pR, θ
〉
)−u′S(
〈
pR, θ
〉
)
(〈
qS, rRθ
〉
〈qS, rR〉 −
〈
pR, θ
〉)
=
∫ 〈qS,rRθ〉
〈qS,rR〉
〈pR,θ〉
∫ t
〈pR,θ〉
u′′S(τ)dτdt,
we can rewrite (42) as
u′S(
〈
pR, θ
〉
)
〈
ε, rR
〉
∆S <
∫ 〈qS,rRθ〉
〈qS,rR〉
〈pR,θ〉
∫ t
〈pR,θ〉
u′′S(τ)dτdt.
By the mean value theorem, we have
∫ 〈qS,rRθ〉
〈qS,rR〉
〈pR,θ〉
∫ t
〈pR,θ〉
u′′S(τ)dτdt ≥ −max |u′′S(a)|
∫ 〈qS,rRθ〉
〈qS,rR〉
〈pR,θ〉
∫ t
〈pR,θ〉
dτdt = −1
2
max |u′′S(a)|∆2S.
Moreover, if ε satisfies (41), then it also satisfies〈
ε, rR
〉
minu′S(a) < −
1
2
max |u′′S(a)|∆S,
implying that ε also satisfies (42) since
u′S(
〈
pR, θ
〉
)
〈
ε, rR
〉
∆S <
〈
ε, rR
〉
∆S minu
′
S(a) < −
1
2
max |u′′S(a)|∆2S ≤
∫ 〈qS,rRθ〉
〈qS,rR〉
〈pR,θ〉
∫ t
〈pR,θ〉
u′′S(τ)dτdt.
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For each ε satisfying (41), we now construct an experiment that improves the sender’s
expected utility and that has a realization that induces belief pS + ε in the sender. Let υ be
the excess of the right-hand side over the left-hand side in (42),
υ = VS(p
S + ε)− VS(pS)−
〈∇VS(pS), ε〉 > 0. (43)
Consider the experiment pi(ε, δ) with Z = {ε+, ε−} , such that PrS[z = ε+] = δ, and if
z = ε+, then the sender’s posterior is pS + ε. A taylor series expansion of VS(q
S) yields
VS(q
S) = VS(p
S) +
〈∇VS(pS), qS − pS〉+ L (qS − pS) , with lim
t→0
L
(
t
(
qS − pS))
t
= 0. (44)
Then, the sender’s gain from pi(ε, δ) is
∆pi(ε,δ) = δ
(
VS(p
S + ε)− VS(pS)
)
+ (1− δ)
(
VS(p
S − δ
1− δ ε)− VS(p
S)
)
= δ
(
υ +
〈∇VS(pS), ε〉)− δ 〈∇VS(pS), ε〉+ L(− δ
1− δ ε
)
= δ
(
υ − (1− δ) L (−δε/(1− δ))
(−δ/(1− δ))
)
.
The convergence to zero of the second term in the parentheses when δ tends to zero and
υ > 0 guarantees the existence of δ > 0 such that ∆pi(ε,δ) > 0. 
Proof of Proposition B.1: First, we introduce additional notation. With lrR(ε) defined
as in (40), define the sets M(rR) by
M(rR) =
{
ε : lrR(ε) < −m, ∆S > 0, pS + ε ∈ ∆ (Θ)
}
.
Note that rS and θ are negatively collinear if and only if rR and rRθ are positively collinear.
That is, the condition on Proposition 5 could instead be stated in terms of collinearity of
rR and rRθ. Moreover, if rR and rRθ are not collinear, then the restriction of lrR(ε) to
{ε : 〈ε, 1〉 = 0} is surjective, and, thus, the set M(rR) is non-empty.
Define the function
Ψ
(
ε, rR
)
=
〈
ε, rR −mfR〉+ (〈ε, rR〉)2 , with fR = rRθ − 〈pS, rRθ〉 ,
which characterizes M(rR) since for ε such that pS+ε ∈ ∆ (Θ), Ψ (ε, rR) ≤ 0 and 〈ε, fR〉 ≥ 0
if and only if ε ∈M(rR). Finally, let
γ = 2
(
1 +m (max |θ|+ ‖θ‖) + (4 +m ‖θ‖) sup
rR∈R
∥∥rR∥∥) , (45)
Z = min
ε∈{ε:pS+ε∈∆(Θ)},rR∈R
Ψ
(
ε, rR
)
s.t.
〈
ε, rR
(
θ − 〈pS, rRθ〉)〉 ≤ 0, rR ∈ R. (46)
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Under the conditions of Proposition B.1, Z < 0. Finally, define β in (39) as
β =
|Z|
γ
. (47)
Our proof is structured in two steps that show (i) if ∩rR∈RM(rR) is non-empty, then fol-
lowing Lemma B.1 allows us to design an experiment pi that increases the sender’s expected
utility for every receiver’s belief in the support of h(pR|pS); and (ii) under the conditions of
Proposition B.1, ∩rR∈RM(rR) 6= ∅.
Step (i) - Suppose that ε ∈ ∩rR∈RM(rR). Consider υ as defined by (43). As υ is a continuous
function of rR in the compact set R, it achieves a minimum υ= minrR∈R υ > 0. Then, define
δ as
δ = min
{
δ : υ +
L
(− δ
1−δε
)
δ
≥ 0
}
,
with the function L given by (44). Now, define the experiment pi(ε, δ′) as in the proof of
Lemma B.1— i.e., Z = {ε+, ε−} , qS(ε+) = pS +ε and PrS[z = ε+] = δ′, and set δ′ =δ. Then,
the sender’s gain from pi(ε, δ′) is positive for any receiver’s prior in Supp(h(pR|pS)).
Step (ii) - Fix pR
′
with associated likelihood ratio rR
′ ∈ R. For any rR ∈ R with η = rR−rR′ ,
we have
Ψ
(
ε, rR
)−Ψ(ε, rR′) = (1 +m〈pS, rR′θ〉+ 〈ε, rR + rR′〉) 〈ε, η〉−m 〈ε, ηθ〉+m 〈pS, ηθ〉 〈ε, r〉 .
The following bounds make use of the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality (in particular, the im-
plication that |〈ε, ηθ〉| ≤ ‖ε‖ ‖η‖ ‖θ‖—see Steele, 2004)28 and the fact that ∥∥pS∥∥ ≤ 1 and
‖ε‖ = ∥∥qS − pS∥∥ ≤ 2,
∣∣∣1 +m〈pS, rR′θ〉+ 〈ε, rR + rR′〉∣∣∣ ≤ 1 +mmax θ + 4 sup
rR∈R
∥∥rR∥∥ ,
|m 〈ε, ηθ〉| ≤ m ‖ε‖ ‖η‖ ‖θ‖ ≤ 2m ‖η‖ ‖θ‖ ,∣∣m 〈pS, ηθ〉 〈ε, r〉∣∣ ≤ 2m ‖η‖ ‖θ‖ sup
rR∈R
∥∥rR∥∥ .
28Steele, J. M. (2004) “The Cauchy-Schwarz Master Class: An Introduction to the Art of Mathematical
Inequalities,” Mathematical Association of America.
8
From these bounds, we then obtain the following estimate∣∣∣Ψ (ε, rR)−Ψ(ε, rR′)∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣1 +m〈pS, rR′θ〉+ 〈ε, rR + rR′〉∣∣∣ ‖ε‖ ‖η‖
+ |m 〈ε, ηθ〉|+ ∣∣m 〈pS, ηθ〉 〈ε, r〉∣∣
≤ 2
(
1 +mmax θ + 4 sup
rR∈R
∥∥rR∥∥) ‖η‖+ 2m ‖θ‖ ‖η‖
+2m ‖θ‖ sup
rR∈R
∥∥rR∥∥ ‖η‖
= γ ‖η‖ ,
where γ is defined by (45). Selecting ε′ an rR
′
that solve the program (46) and noting that
Z < 0, we have that for any rR ∈ R,
Ψ
(
ε′, rR
)
= Ψ
(
ε′, rR
′
)
+ Ψ
(
ε′, rR
)−Ψ(ε′, rR′) ≤ Z + γ ‖η‖ ≤ Z + |Z| = 0.
This implies that ε′ ∈M(rR) for all rR ∈ R. 
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